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The essence of the Cartesian concept of a person is that of a mind, also commonly 
known as a pure ego, or a subject of experience. In René Descartes’ words, “My 
essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing”. He argues that he 
can conceive of a person existing without his body, but he cannot likewise 
conceive of a person existing without his mind. Therefore, it must be the case that 
the essence of the concept of a person is that of a subject of experience. P. F. 
Strawson, however, rejects this Cartesian concept. In ‘Persons’, of Individuals, 
Strawson offers a three-premise argument for the conclusion that anyone whose 
concept of a person is essentially that of a subject of experience, or a pure ego, 
loses the concept of his own self. The argument, as Strawson puts it, runs as 
follows: one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe 
them to others. And one can ascribe states of consciousness to others only if one 
can identify them. But one cannot identify other people if one can identify them 
only as subjects of experience. It follows that if one can identify other people only 
as subjects of experience, then one cannot ascribe states of consciousness to 
oneself. The Cartesian claims that he can identify other people only as subjects of 
experience. That is, he claims that the essence of his concept of a person is that of 
a subject of experience. Therefore, Strawson concludes that the Cartesian cannot 
ascribe states of consciousness to his own self. Put another away, Strawson 
claims that the Cartesian does not even have the concept of his own self. More 
generally, this Cartesian concept of a person is an empty one.  
My thesis is a defense of Strawson’s argument against the Cartesian 
concept of a person. I will take a detailed look at each of Strawson’s three central 
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premises in his argument and first clarify some of the ambiguities latent in them. 
Strawson’s original argument will be rephrased to better bring out his position. 
Then, I will examine some of the objections to the individual premises. I argue 
that these objections do not work, and thus Strawson’s argument against 
Cartesianism is sound. This has certain implications on both the epistemological 
and conceptual problems of other minds, which I will elaborate.  
Lastly, I will explain Strawson’s alternative account of a person with 
which he replaces the empty Cartesian concept. The difference between the 
Strawsonian concept of a person and the Cartesian concept of a pure ego will be 
highlighted. And its place within the larger context of scepticism about other 




I) The Big Picture  
The concept of the first-person is one that we take for granted. A typical self-
introduction would be something like this: “I am so-and-so. I come from such-
and-such a place. I am of a particular age, and have a certain job. There is a given 
number of people in my family, and I enjoy certain activities.” While the question 
of what goes into the concept of ‘I’, the first-person – and the concept of persons 
in general – is a matter of intense philosophical debate, few would deny that we 
have the concept. In other words, the common view is though we may not be 
entirely clear on what we mean when we say ‘I am so-and-so’, we do not, at the 
very least, take ourselves to be uttering nonsense. The sentence ‘I am so-and-so’ 
is, in a significant sense, intelligible, unlike a sentence ‘A quix is such-and-such’, 
for example.1 The concept of oneself is intelligible to us in a way that the concept 
of a quix is not: we have the concept of the former, even if only partially 
illuminated, but we do not have any concept of the latter since there is no such 
concept to be had. It is a basic assumption of our ordinary discourse that first-
person utterances are not incoherent.  
 Among competing theories of what a person is, one stands out as being 
the most congenial to our intuitions. According to this theory, a person is a 
combination of two distinct types of substances: a pure ego, and a physical body. 
They are distinct because an ego, also commonly known as ‘a mind’, is not a 
physical object, on this view. Paradigm cases of physical objects are tables, 
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chairs, stones and trees etc. They are physical objects because they have physical 
properties. Representative examples of physical properties are height, weight, 
shape and position. We say things such as ‘The table weighs ten kilos’, and ‘The 
stone is in the river’.2 According to this view, physical properties can be 
attributed only to the physical body, but not, properly speaking, to the ego. The 
expression ‘a pure ego’ is often used to emphasise that a mind is not construed as 
a physical object on this theory. The mind, or the pure ego, does not have 
physical properties. It has, however, mental properties. Sensations, thoughts, 
beliefs and emotions are, par excellence, examples of mental states, or 
experiences. Examples of mental properties would be that of being in pain, 
feeling sad, wanting to be happy, thinking that 2 + 2 = 4 etc. On this view, only 
the ego, and not the physical body, is, properly speaking, the subject of 
experience. Hence mental properties would belong only to the mind, and not to 
the body. However, the theory also claims that it is a contingent fact that a person 
is a compound of a pure ego and a physical body. This means that while, as a 
matter of fact, a person has a mind and a body, the state of affairs of the world 
could have been otherwise. It could have been possible that a person is just an ego 
that is never attached to any physical body. A proponent of this view argues that 
if it is possible to conceive of a person existing as an ego without a body, then the 
essence of the concept of a person must be that of an ego. And he maintains that it 
is indeed possible to conceive of a person existing as such. Therefore, the concept 
of a person is essentially that of a pure ego. But this is not to deny an earlier claim 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 The concept of a quix is an imaginary one which I have made up.  
2 Rivers, shadows and the like also count as physical objects since some physical properties are 
attributed to them. For example, we say ‘This river is wide’, and ‘My shadow falls on my right’.  
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that a person is a combination of an ego and a body, in other words, an embodied 
ego. These two claims can be consistent with one another given that it is only 
contingently so that an ego is embodied. It is the concept of the ego that is 
essential to the concept of a person. This concept of a person is derivative. This is 
because the concept of a person is to be analysed in terms of the concept of an 
ego. One must have the concept of the ego in order to have the concept of a 
person. René Descartes is perhaps the best-known proponent of this view. In the 
Sixth Meditation, he writes:  
the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another 
is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are 
capable of being separated . . . I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far 
as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand, I have a 
distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. 
And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can 
exist without it. 3 
 
Descartes claims he is really a thinking, non-extended thing, that he can exist as 
such a pure ego. This is his concept of the first-person, and also of people in 
general: essentially, people are thinking, non-extended things. Henceforth, I shall 
call this view ‘Cartesianism’, and its proponent ‘the Cartesian’. Though the above 
is only a rough sketch of the position, I believe it captures the spirit of it. It is a 
view that many of us are partial to.  
 Yet Cartesianism, though intuitive, has been attacked over the centuries. A 
particular criticism is the focus of this thesis. In the chapter ‘Persons’ of 
Individuals, P. F. Strawson puts forth a specific three-premise argument against 
the traditional Cartesian concept of a person. This argument stands out from some 
other criticisms of Cartesianism with its simple structure and clearly marked out 
                                                          
3 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, tr. John Cottingham, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 54.  
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premises. Strawson objects to the central claim of Cartesianism: the view that the 
essence of the concept of a person is that of an ego. He argues that anyone who 
holds that the concept of a person is essentially that of an ego will lose the 
concept of his own self. This means that the concept of oneself, the first-person, is 
empty, if Strawson’s argument is sound. Any utterances that involve the first-
person pronoun, such as ‘I am so-and-so’, ‘I come from such-and-such a place’, 
will likewise be unintelligible. This must be an absurd conclusion for it is a basic 
assumption of our ordinary discourse that first-person utterances are not 
incoherent. We do take ourselves to possess at least some concept of the first-
person, even if it is not fully illuminated. To concede that one has no such 
concept at all would be to remove an important assumption on which 
interpersonal communication, among other things, is based. Hence, in Strawson’s 
opinion, any theory of a person that requires us to give up the concept of oneself 
must be suspect, and we are better off rejecting that theory to begin with. The 
three central premises of his argument are these:  
One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to 
others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of 
experience. And one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as 
subjects of experience, possessors of states of consciousness.4  
 
A conclusion that can be validly drawn from the above premises is that whoever 
maintains he can identify other people only as subjects of experience, or pure 
egos, cannot ascribe states of consciousness to his own self. Since the Cartesian is 
                                                          
4 P. F. Strawson, ‘Persons’, Individuals, (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 100. We may take 
Strawson’s use of the expression “states of consciousness” to refer to the mental states I have 
earlier mentioned. Current convention maintains a difference between a mental and a conscious 
state because there may be mental states of which one is not conscious. But this finer-grained 
distinction was less pertinent at the time Individuals was written. Strawson’s use of the expression 
“subjects of experience” is also synonymous with the terms ‘pure egos’, or ‘pure consciousness’. 
Henceforth, I will use these expressions interchangeably.  
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presumably one such person who would hold that he can identify other people 
only as subjects of experience, then, according to Strawson’s argument, the 
Cartesian cannot ascribe states of consciousness to even himself.  
I would like to pause here to clarify what it means to say ‘One can/cannot 
ascribe states of consciousness to oneself/others’. This statement appears 
throughout Strawson’s argument and there are two senses in which it may be 
understood. For brevity, I will explain the different senses using the statement 
‘One cannot ascribe states of consciousness to others’. It can be read in this 
conceptual sense: ‘One cannot meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness to 
others.’ In other words, it would be unintelligible to ascribe states of 
consciousness to others. An analogous use of the expression in the conceptual 
sense would be to say ‘One cannot (meaningfully) ascribe states of consciousness 
to numbers’. To do so would be unintelligible, tantamount to uttering nonsense. 
One has no such concept of conscious numbers. This is the sense in which 
Strawson intends to use the expression throughout the argument. Hence, in the 
way he uses it, to say that one can ascribe states of consciousness to 
oneself/others is just to say that one has the concept of oneself/others. 
Conversely, to say that one cannot ascribe states of consciousness to 
oneself/others is just to say that one fails to have the corresponding concepts. The 
conceptual sense should not be confused with an epistemic reading of the same 
statement: ‘One cannot ascribe states of consciousness to others’. On this reading, 
the statement means ‘One cannot justifiably ascribe states of consciousness to 
others’. There are many ways in which one may be unjustified in ascribing a 
particular conscious state to someone. Say someone tells me that John, my friend, 
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is happy. I may want to believe my informant’s words, but I may not be justified 
in doing so because John is overseas and I do not even know where he is, let 
alone whether he is happy or not. Or suppose John is in the next room and I go to 
him, but I see that he has a crestfallen face – hardly what you would expect to see 
of a happy man. In this case, I also cannot (justifiably) ascribe happiness to him, 
i.e.; I am not justified in believing that he is happy. One can fail to ascribe states 
of consciousness to someone in the epistemic sense without failing in the 
conceptual sense. For example, I may be unjustified in believing that John is 
happy, but I certainly have the concept of John as a happy man. But if I do not 
have the concept of John as a happy man, then the question of whether I am 
justified in believing that he is happy will not even arise. Now that I have 
clarified the different readings of the statement ‘One cannot ascribe states of 
consciousness to others’ and explained how the two readings may be related to 
one another, I stress that Strawson is not using the said expression in the 
epistemic sense. So, to be unable to ascribe states of consciousness to others is 
just to fail to have the concept of other conscious people, for Strawson.  
With this conceptual reading in mind, Strawson’s argument can be 
rephrased as follows:  
One has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. One 
has the concept of other people only if one can identify them. And one cannot 
identify other people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects of 
experience.5 
 
So, whoever maintains that the essence of his concept of other people is that of 
subjects of experience does not have the concept of his own self. Since the 
                                                          
5 I have also rewritten the third premise, which was originally: “One cannot identify other people 
if one can identify other people only as subjects of experience”. I will leave to chapter 3 to explain 
why I did so.  
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Cartesian holds that essentially, his concept of a person is the concept of a subject 
of experience, it follows that the Cartesian does not even have the concept of 
himself. If Strawson’s argument is sound, then the Cartesian should find all first-
person utterances, such as ‘I am in pain’, ‘I see a computer before me’, ‘I believe 
that God exists’, unintelligible because he fails to have even the concept of his 
own self. This must be a shocking conclusion for the common view is that first- 
person utterances are, in a significant sense, intelligible. When one utters ‘I am in 
pain’, one does not take oneself to be uttering nonsense. And yet, according to 
Strawson’s argument, the statement would be incoherent for the Cartesian, not 
very much unlike the statement ‘The quix is in pain’ is incoherent. Strawson 
argues that the Cartesian has no such concept of his own self, just as he (and all of 
us) has no such concept of a quix. If adopting the Cartesian view that the concept 
of a person is essentially that of a pure ego commits one to such serious 
conceptual difficulties, then, in Strawson’s opinion, one might as well reject 
Cartesianism.  
Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, by his own admission, is of a 
partly conceptual and partly epistemological character.6 However he does not 
clearly separate the conceptual from the epistemological part. Furthermore, the 
ambiguity latent in some of his expressions, one of which being the expression 
‘can ascribe’, adds to the confusion that plagues some commentators. I have 
rephrased Strawson’s argument to better distinguish its conceptual from its 
epistemological aspects. All my discussion henceforth will be in reference to the 
new version. Yet, even with this paraphrase, the argument is hardly transparent as 
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it stands. The course of my research reveals that little has been done by way of a 
careful exposition, so one aim of this thesis is to explain in detail what this 
particular argument is. If the reader walks away with a better understanding of it, 
I will consider this purpose fulfilled. But my second, and more ambitious aim, is 
to defend the argument against its critics. I maintain that Strawson’s argument is 
sound, however counter-intuitive its conclusion may now appear, namely, the 
conclusion that the Cartesian does not have the concept of his own self. By 
examining what I take to be the most forceful objections against it and arguing 
that they do not work, I hope to persuade the reader of its resilience.7 But why do 
I harp on yet another criticism of the Cartesian position which, by now, has 
already been much discredited? Surely Cartesianism will fare no better even 
without Strawson’s attack? Strawson wrote this, elsewhere, about Cartesianism:  
One of the marks, though not a necessary mark, of a really great philosopher is to 
make a really great mistake: that is to say, to give a persuasive and lastingly 
influential form to one of those fundamental misconceptions to which the human 
intellect is prone when it concerns itself with the ultimate categories of thought. 
So today, more than three hundred years after the death of René Descartes, 
philosophers struggling with one of these fundamental misconceptions think of it 
under the name of Cartesian dualism. Not that they all think of the doctrine in 
question as a misconception. The doctrine has its defenders. Indeed if it did not 
represent a way of thinking about mind and body which has a powerful 
intellectual appeal, it would not be worth struggling against. There is little point 
in refuting errors which no one is inclined to make.8 
 
Strawson thinks the Cartesian concept of oneself is empty. If the Cartesian wants 
to retain his position, he can do so only on pain of forgoing his concept of his 
own self. But a deeper examination of Strawson’s argument will reveal that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 This is made especially clear in P. F. Strawson, ‘Self, Mind and Body’, in Freedom and 
Resentment and other essays, (London: Methuen, 1974).  
7 Although many have responded to Strawson’s work in ‘Persons’, surprisingly few directly 
address this specific three-premise argument against Cartesianism. In this thesis, I focus on three 
of the best articulated objections to Strawson’s argument. But at suitable points, I will highlight to 
readers other existing literature that relate, more broadly, to Strawson’s work in ‘Persons’.  
8 Ibid, p. 169 
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Cartesian loses more than the concept of his own self. He loses also the concept 
of other people, and hence of people, in general. In other words, the concepts of 
himself, of others, and of a person, in general, are all at stake for the Cartesian. 
This will become clearer as the thesis progresses. For Strawson, the flaw of 
Cartesianism cuts into the ‘ultimate categories of thought’. I think it is interesting 
that in Strawson’s opinion, such an intuitive account of a person as the Cartesian 
one threatens so many concepts that we take for granted. Strawson struggled 
against Cartesianism because its misconception is so powerful. I will struggle for 
Strawson because his claim is so bold. I also think once we appreciate the 
strength of his argument, we will realise his insight into the structures of our 
conceptual framework. At this point, I can only ask the reader for a little patience 
to allow me to justify my regard for Strawson’s position as the thesis unfolds.  
 
II) Strawson’s Argument against Cartesianism 
 To recapitulate, Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism runs as such. 
He points out that one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of 
other people. And one has the concept of other people only if one can identify 
them. But one cannot identify other people if the essence of one’s concept of 
other people is that of subjects of experience. From these premises, he draws the 
conclusion that if one maintains that the concept of a subject of experience is the 
essence of one’s concept of a person, then one does not have the concept of 
oneself. A Cartesian holds that essentially, his concept of other people, and of 
people in general, is the concept of subjects of experience. Given this, it follows, 
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on Strawson’s argument, that the Cartesian does not even have the concept of his 
own self. 
 The argument is a valid one. The first premise states that to have the 
concept of oneself, it is necessary that one also has the concept of other people. 
But the second premise claims that one has the concept of other people only if 
one can identify them. In other words, unless one can identify other people, one 
does not have the concept of them. From these two premises, it follows that if one 
is to have the concept of oneself at all, one must be able to identify other people. 
However, one cannot identify other people if the essence of one’s concept of 
other people is that of subjects of experience, the third premise asserts. Since the 
essence of the Cartesian’s concept of a person is indeed that of a subject of 
experience, the Cartesian cannot identify other people. He fails to satisfy the 
necessary condition to have the concept of oneself. Hence, he does not have the 
concept of his own self. Given the argument’s validity, critics of Strawson 
typically object to one or other of his three central premises – they leave 
untouched the claim that the essence of the Cartesian’s concept of a person is that 
of a pure ego. Since this is the central thesis of traditional Cartesianism, no one 
who wants to defend it will wish to quarrel with that premise. The upcoming 
chapters 1, 2, and 3 will be devoted to an in-depth study, and a defence, of each of 
Strawson’s three central premises respectively. But here is a brief introduction to 
them.  
 Strawson begins his argument with the premise that one has the concept of 
oneself only if one has the concept of other people. This premise is making a 
conceptual point. Strawson writes:  
 11
The main point here is a purely logical one: the idea of a predicate is correlative 
with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be 
significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.9  
 
I will address in chapter 1 what it is to be a predicate, and how this purely logical 
premise has a bearing on the Cartesian position. But the broad picture behind the 
logical premise is this. The concept of being a person is a general one. Loosely 
speaking, that is the view that it must be at least theoretically possible that various 
individuals can satisfy the concept of being a person. And ordinarily, we do 
operate with such a general concept of a person: we think of others as people, like 
us. We conceive of ourselves, as well as of others, as conscious subjects. No one 
would think it is theoretically impossible for anyone else but oneself to satisfy the 
concept of being such a person. Since we accept that the concept of a person is 
general, then we must also be prepared to grant that to have the concept of oneself 
– as one such person – one must admit, at minimum, the theoretical possibility 
that other people exist; that is, to have at least the concept of other people. 
Strawson says:  
it is a necessary condition of one’s ascribing states of consciousness, 
experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, 
or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself.10 
 
This premise is the least controversial among the three. I have not come across 
any objection to the conceptual point that it makes. For example, A. J. Ayer 
grants that “It is, indeed, a mark of a general concept, such as the concept of 
being a person, that no limitations is placed upon the number of individuals to 
which it can apply.”11 For the sake of clarity, I will use chapter 1 to reinforce our 
                                                          
9 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 99 
10Ibid, p. 99, my italics. 
11 A. J. Ayer, ‘The Concept of a Person’, in The Concept of a Person, (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1963), p. 104 
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understanding of the first premise, and argue that it is least profitable for the 
Cartesian to quarrel with it.  
 Strawson’s second premise is that one has the concept of other people 
only if one can identify them. To be able to identify a particular, in this case, is to 
be able to pick out, or distinguish, that particular among many. For example, a 
toddler pointing to a certain ball and not to a certain book, upon suitable prompt, 
would suggest that he can identify the ball. An eye-witness who pieces together a 
sketch of a criminal on an I.D. kit would count as being able to identify the 
criminal. Strawson is maintaining that unless one can identify other people, one 
does not have the concept of them. It is an in-principle identification that is at 
issue here. He points out that it is a feature of our conceptual scheme that one can 
refer to a class of particulars, talk to each other about members of this class, count 
them as among the things that exist, only if this class is capable of being 
identified, at least in principle. 
That it should be possible to identify particulars of a given type seems a 
necessary condition of the inclusion of that type in our ontology. For what could 
we mean by claiming to acknowledge the existence of a class of particular things 
and to talk to each other about members of this class, if we qualified the claim by 
adding that it was in principle impossible for any one of us to make any other of 
us understand which member, or members, of this class he was at any time 
talking about? The qualification would seem to stultify the claim.12 
 
Consider a scenario where one acknowledges the existence of a class of 
particulars, call it the class of Xs, in one’s conceptual framework, but disclaims 
any theoretical possibility of any Xs being identified at all. The prima facie 
absurdity of this scenario strongly suggests that if it is in principle impossible for 
any Xs to be identified, then the concept of Xs is empty. It is empty because 
nothing answers to this concept. For example, suppose someone tells you quixes 
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exist in this world but it is impossible for anyone to identify any of them, even in 
principle. You will naturally take this person to be speaking unintelligibly. He has 
not made any genuine reference to a quix, and it is understandable to regard the 
concept of quixes as empty. You have no such concept of it. In the same vein, 
Strawson asserts that one has the concept of other people only if one can identify 
them. More generally, he points out that unless one can, at least in principle, 
identify various instances of a certain concept, one does not count as having this 
concept.  
 Unlike the first premise that makes a purely conceptual point, this second 
premise links a conceptual issue with an epistemological one. I emphasize this 
because there is a tendency to conflate the first premise with the second and take 
the former to make both a conceptual and an epistemological point. That would 
be to misunderstand both premises. The first premise is a purely conceptual one. 
It is in this second premise that Strawson reminds us that concept-possession 
bears certain epistemological commitments. He asserts that one counts as 
possessing a certain concept, such as the concept of other people, only if one can, 
at least in principle, identify various instances of it. This second premise has 
invited much objection. Critics of Strawson generally deny that one must be able 
to identify instances of a particular concept to lay claim to it. They hold that it 
seems at least conceivable for one to possess a certain concept, but never be in a 
position to identify any of its instances. I will explore what this objection is really 
saying, in chapter 2. I grant that, prima facie, the response is intuitive, but I will 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 16 
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argue that it is misplaced. There are persuasive considerations to agree with 
Strawson’s assertion here. 
 Lastly, Strawson claims in the third premise that one cannot identify other 
people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects of experience. 
Strawson does not explicitly argue for this premise, though it can be discerned 
from his writings that it would have been something like this. If the essence of 
one’s concept of other people is that of subjects of experience, then, one can 
identify others only by identifying their experience. Put another way, if the 
essence of one’s concept of others is that of subjects of experience, then, in order 
to identify these subjects of experience, it is necessary to identify the experience 
of which they are subjects. However, there is one reading on which the Cartesian 
would accept that if one’s essential concept of other people is that of subjects of 
experience, then one cannot identify the experience of others. That is the sense 
that one is not directly acquainted with other people’s experiences. A 
characteristically Cartesian thinking is the view that one has intimate knowledge 
of only one’s own conscious states; one has no such intimate acquaintance with 
another’s conscious states. The Cartesian would typically observe another 
person’s bodily behavior to infer the conscious state that the person is in. So, in 
this sense, the Cartesian would concede that one cannot identify, that is, one is 
not directly acquainted with, the experience of others if one’s essential concept of 
them is that of pure egos. Yet, as before, if the essence of one’s concept of other 
people is that of subjects of experience, or pure egos, then one must identify their 
experience in order to identify them. Hence, Strawson asserts, in the third 
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premise, that one cannot identify others if one’s essential concept of them is that 
of subjects of experience.  
 I have mentioned that commentators generally grant Strawson the first of 
his three central premises. Though the second one seems dubious, I will maintain 
that it is also true. If so, then refuting this last premise would be the only 
remaining way for the Cartesian to defend his position. (We recall that he would 
not deny his essential concept of people is that of pure egos.) I will assess this 
route of defence in chapter 3. In particular, I will examine a possible Cartesian 
retort to the view that the only way to identify others, given his essential concept 
of them, is to identify their experience. The Cartesian retorts that he can also 
identify others by identifying the bodies to which they belong, even if his concept 
of a person is essentially that of an ego. That is, bodies are an indirect means 
through which a Cartesian can identify other people, he claims. Hence, he thinks 
it is not true that given his essential concept of a person, he can identify other 
people only by identifying their experience. I will show in chapter 3 that this route 
of defence also fails. I maintain that Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism is 
sound.  
 
III) Returning to the Big Picture 
 There is a familiar sceptical problem in the philosophy of mind known as 
‘The Problem of Other Minds’. I want to briefly outline this problem so as to 
locate Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism within a larger picture. It will 
also help us better appreciate the appeal in Strawson’s alternative concept of a 
person when I turn to it in the concluding chapter.  
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 The traditional problem of other minds is concerned with the question of 
how we know that other people are conscious. Do we have good reasons to 
believe that other people exist? Or, to use Strawson’s expression, can we 
justifiably ascribe states of consciousness to others? It is an epistemological 
problem because it concerns the status of our knowledge claims pertaining to 
other minds. This problem would plague the Cartesian. Experience, for the 
Cartesian, is necessarily private. He has direct acquaintance with only his own 
experience. He has no such acquaintance with other people’s, but merely observes 
their bodily behavior. The worry then is: if the Cartesian has no direct 
acquaintance with others’ experience, then he would seem to have no good 
grounds to ascribe experience to them because he would concede that bodily 
behavior offers no guarantee that another is conscious of that person’s experience 
in the same way that he is conscious of his own. Strawson characterises the 
sceptic’s position in another way. In ordinary language, the word ‘pain’ that 
occurs in the statement ‘I am in pain’ and ‘John is in pain’ are taken to mean one 
and the same thing. The common view is that John feels pain, upon hitting 
himself, in the same way that I would if I were to do like so. Predicates ascribing 
states of consciousness, such as ‘being in pain’, ‘feeling an itch’, are used in the 
same sense whether they are ascribed to oneself or to others. However, when I 
say ‘I am in pain’, my utterance expresses an experience which I feel directly. 
There is no need for me to perform a prior check with myself if I am indeed 
feeling a painful sensation to deem this a true utterance. But when the predicate 
‘feeling pain’ is ascribed to another, some form of verification, however 
inconclusive, is available and often times utilised. One would count the statement 
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‘John is in pain’ as true if, say, John quickly withdraws his arm when I stick a pin 
into him, and he does not behave like so when the same is done to Harry, or that 
he does not laugh heartily when I poke him again. Bodily behavior provides some 
rough criteria to verify the truth-value of any other-ascriptions of conscious 
states. Strawson represents the sceptic’s complaint as follows:  
How could the sense [of predicates ascribing states of consciousness] be the 
same when the method of verification was so different in the two cases – or, 
rather, when there was a method of verification in the one case (the case of 
others) and not, properly speaking, in the other case (the case of oneself).’13 
 
It is generally agreed that the Cartesian faces the epistemological problem 
of other minds. The third central premise of Strawson’s argument, if true, would 
capture this problem for the Cartesian. If the essence of one’s concept of other 
people is that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify other people. 
This is because if one holds such a view of other people, then the only way to 
identify them is to identify their experience. But the Cartesian would concede that 
one cannot identify the experience of other people, in the sense that one is not 
directly acquainted with their experience; one is so acquainted with only one’s 
own. Hence, it follows that if one’s concept of other people is essentially that of 
subjects of experience, which, presumably, the Cartesian’s is, then one cannot 
identify other such people. This is the epistemological problem of other minds. 
But Strawson also states in the second central premise that if one cannot identify 
other people, then one does not have the concept of them. It is in light of this 
second premise that the Cartesian not only fails to be able to identify other 
people, but he also fails to have this concept. That is, the Cartesian not only has 
an epistemological problem of other minds, he has a conceptual problem of other 
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minds too. And finally, Strawson’s first central premise claims that one must have 
the concept of other people to have the concept of oneself. Therefore, in losing 
the concept of other people, the Cartesian loses also the concept of his own self. 
To sum up, if Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism is sound, then the 
Cartesian faces both an epistemological problem of other minds, and a conceptual 
problem of minds, in general: the Cartesian has neither the concept of others nor 
that of himself. To Strawson, the essential Cartesian concept of a person is empty. 
He writes:  
it becomes impossible to see how we could come by the idea of different, 
distinguishable, identifiable subjects of experiences – different consciousnesses – 
if this idea is thought of as logically primitive, as a logical ingredient in the 
compound-idea of a person, the latter being composed of two subjects. For there 
could never be any question of assigning an experience, as such, to any subject 
other than oneself; and therefore never any question of assigning it to oneself 
either, never any question of ascribing it to a subject at all.14  
 
In the chapter ‘Persons’, Strawson does more than demolish the (essential) 
Cartesian concept of a person. He also offers his account of what a person is. I 
will elaborate upon it only in my final chapter, after we have a better 
understanding of why we should even reject the intuitive Cartesian account to 
begin with. Admittedly, the Cartesian view is not without its appeal. If anything, 
it is Strawson’s astonishing conclusion that the Cartesian loses even the concept 
of his own self that seems the harder pill to swallow. I devote the next three 
chapters to a critical examination, and defence, of Strawson’s three main premises 
respectively. At the end of which, I hope the strength, and insight, of his 
argument will become more apparent. Only then will I reveal what the concept of 
a person ought to be, in Strawson’s opinion.  
 
13 Strawson (1959), op. cit., pp. 99-100 
14 Ibid, p. 102 
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Chapter 1: The First Premise: What Makes a Genuine Concept?  
 
I) Overview 
The central claim of Cartesianism is that the essence of the concept of a person is 
that of a subject of experience, otherwise known as a pure ego or a mind. A 
subject of experience, in the Cartesian sense, is not a physical object, and it has 
only mental properties, properly speaking. The Cartesian argues that if it is 
possible to conceive of a person existing without a body, but impossible to 
conceive of him existing without a mind, then the concept of a mind must be the 
essence of the concept of a person. And the Cartesian maintains that it is so 
possible to conceive of a person existing without a body but not correspondingly 
possible to conceive of him existing without a mind. Hence, the concept of a 
person, for the Cartesian, is essentially that of a mind, or a pure ego. In the 
chapter ‘Persons’ of Individuals, Strawson advances a precise three-premise 
argument against the Cartesian concept of a person. He charges that the Cartesian 
does not even have the concept of his own self. As indicated on p. 6 of my 
introduction, the three central premises of his argument are these:  
One has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. One 
has the concept of other people only if one can identify them. And one cannot 
identify other people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects of 
experience. 
 
From these premises, it follows that anyone whose concept of other people is 
essentially that of subjects of experience does not have the concept of his own 
self. Given that the Cartesian’s concept of a person, in general, is essentially as 
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such, Strawson concludes that the Cartesian fails to have even the concept of 
himself.  
 In this chapter, I focus on Strawson’s first central premise, namely, the 
claim that one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other 
people. Even though I think this is the least controversial of the three central 
premises, some issues beg clarification here. Firstly, I have found that it is not 
uncommon for commentators to conflate this first premise with the second one in 
Strawson’s argument: that one has the concept of other people only if one can 
identify them. These commentators, mistakenly, think that the first premise is 
making both a conceptual and an epistemological point. My first aim would be to 
caution against such a misunderstanding and emphasize that the first premise, as 
Strawson has explicitly stated, is a purely conceptual one. With that clarification 
out of the way, I then turn to examine the conceptual point that this premise 
makes. Strawson asserts that one must have the concept of other people in order 
to have the concept of oneself. An implicit assumption behind Strawson’s interest 
in the concept of a person is that this concept is a genuine one. In other words, 
talk about oneself as a person and talk about other people are not empty in the 
way that talk about quixes is empty. The concept of a quix is empty because I 
made it up, there is no such concept at all. Ordinarily speaking, we think that the 
concept of a person is genuine. We do not take ourselves to be talking nonsense 
when we talk about people, be it about oneself, or about others. The second aim 
of this chapter then is to get a firmer grasp on what it means for a concept, and 
more specifically, for the concept of a person, to be genuine. Broadly speaking, a 
concept like that of a person is genuine if and only if it satisfies a certain 
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constraint known as ‘the generality constraint’. I will devote a significant amount 
of time to clarifying what the generality constraint is, and how a particular 
concept can be said to have satisfied, or fallen afoul of, this constraint. Along 
with this, I will also explain how the first premise of Strawson’s argument, i.e., 
that one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people, is 
a particular expression of this generality constraint. And lastly, I will examine 
how the Cartesian may attempt to reject Strawson’s first premise, and why he 
might want to reject this premise, and not the other two, to begin with. I have 
maintained that this first premise is the least controversial among the three, and 
indeed, I have not come across anyone who has objected to it as a purely 
conceptual point, not counting those who have conflated it with the second 
premise. So the purpose of crafting an objection to this premise on behalf of the 
Cartesian is really more to play devil’s advocate. The purpose of doing so is to 
bring out its strength and the futility of a Cartesian objection on this front. The 
Cartesian who objects to Strawson’s first premise wants to show that it is not 
necessary for one to have the concept of other people in order to have the concept 
of oneself. And if he can show that, then he presumes there is room for him to 
retain at least the concept of his own self, even if he were to grant that he does not 
have the concept of other people. For dialectical purposes, I will assume that there 
is such a Cartesian who will be prepared to grant this much – that he does not 
have the concept of other people – and assess the efficacy of this strategy. I will 
argue that there are two problems with this response. The more straightforward 
one is that it will not help the traditional Cartesian since this strategy, if it works, 
requires him to give up the concept of other people. But to make such a retreat 
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would already be deviating from the traditional Cartesian position which 
maintains that one has both the concepts of oneself, and of others. Hence, if it is 
traditional Cartesianism that one is interested in defending, then this strategy is 
not the best way to do so. But the second, and more serious, problem with this 
defence is that it does not work at all, for I will use another angle to show that if 
the Cartesian is prepared to give up the concept of other people, then he is indeed 
committed to giving up the concept of his own self. There is no room here to lose 
one without losing the other. Once we view the first premise from this said angle, 
we will also better understand why it is the least disputed among the three 
premises. 
 
II) Differentiating between the First and Second Premises  
 The first premise of Strawson’s argument states that one has the concept 
of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. As mentioned, some critics 
tend to misconstrue this premise as making both a conceptual and an 
epistemological point. For example, Ayer writes in his reply to Strawson: 
It is, indeed, a mark of a general concept, such as the concept of being a person, 
that no limitation is placed upon the number of individuals to which it can apply. 
. . But all that this excludes is the view . . . that it is meaningless to ascribe states 
of consciousness to anything but oneself; it is perfectly compatible with the view 
that one does not know, or even with the view that one cannot know, that such an 
ascription is ever true in fact.1 
 
By a “general concept”, Ayer is referring to a concept that satisfies the generality 
constraint, which I will explain in the next section. But briefly speaking, the 
generality constraint is a constraint on what counts as a genuine concept, as 
                                                          
1 A. J. Ayer, ‘The Concept of a Person’, in The Concept of a Person, (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1963), pp. 104-105 
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opposed to an empty concept such as that of a quix. Ayer grants that if we take 
the concept of a person to be genuine, then we must accept that it is at least 
theoretically possible to meaningfully apply this concept to a range of 
individuals.2 We surely can meaningfully apply this concept to ourselves - we see 
ourselves as a person; the concept of oneself as a person is a meaningful one to 
us. So, to hold that it is theoretically possible to meaningfully apply this concept 
of a person to a range of individuals, we must hold that it is theoretically possible 
to apply it to others too. Ayer rightly points out that if so, then the position of 
conceptual solipsism would be excluded. This is the view that one has only the 
concept of oneself, but not the concept of others. Or, in Ayer’s words, this is the 
view that “it is meaningless to ascribe states of consciousness to anything but 
oneself”. Conceptual solipsism is ruled out because for the concept of a person to 
be genuine, one must have the concept of oneself (as one such person), as well as 
the concept of other people. Hence, taking the concept of a person to be so 
genuine, Ayer grants Strawson that to have the concept of oneself at all, one must 
also have the concept of other people. Ayer accepts the conceptual point made by 
Strawson’s first premise. However, he goes on to assert that the first premise is 
“perfectly compatible with the view that one does not know, or even with the 
view that one cannot know, that [an other-ascription of conscious state] is ever 
true in fact”. This latter view is of an epistemic nature. Ayer subsequently tries to 
persuade us with a thought experiment that the conceptual point made by the first 
premise is consistent with the view that one cannot know that other people exist. 
But nowhere in his discussion about the thought experiment did he make any 
                                                          
2 I will clarify in subsequent sections what exactly is meant here by a meaningful application of a 
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mention of Strawson’s second premise, which links a conceptual issue with an 
epistemological one.3 This premise claims that one has the concept of other 
people only if one can identify them. Instead, he seems to read the first premise as 
making both a conceptual and an epistemological point, and while he concedes 
the former, he denies that he is thereby committed to the latter. Another 
commentator, Chin-Tai Kim, echoes a similar objection:  
The first premise – the thesis that a necessary condition of attributing 
experiences to oneself is that experiences should be attributable to others – is 
ambiguous . . . Strawson’s first premise under the weak interpretation is a 
plausible one. The concept of a subject of experiences is indeed a general 
concept of which there can be instances other than the one referred to by the 
first-person singular pronoun ‘I’ by its user, so that one who attributes 
experiences to oneself must recognize the logical possibility of attributing 
experiences to others. Strawson’s first premise, however, does not simply mean 
this. There is a stronger thesis implied by it, to the effect that in order for one to 
recognize the logicial possibility of the existence of other subjects of 
experiences, one must be actually able to identify other subjects of experiences.4  
 
 I think both commentators have misunderstood Strawson’s first premise. 
Contrary to what Kim thinks, there is no “stronger thesis” implied by it. This 
premise states merely that to have the concept of oneself, one must have the 
concept of other people. It is making merely a conceptual point. It does not state, 
as Kim thinks it does, that in order for one to have the concept of oneself, “one 
must have the general concept of a subject of experiences, and that in order for 
one to have the general concept of a subject of experiences, one must be actually 
able to identify instances of this concept other than oneself.”5 What Kim 
interprets as the “stronger thesis” implied by Strawson’s first premise is really 
just a combination of his first and second premises. Firstly, one has the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                              
particular concept, but for present purposes, an intuitive understanding of it will suffice.  
3 I will talk more about Ayer’s thought experiment in the next chapter.  
4 C. T. Kim, ‘Cartesian Dualism and The Unity of a Mind’, in Mind, New Series, Vol. 80, No. 
319, (Jul 1971), p. 339 
5 Ibid, p. 340, my italics.  
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oneself only if one has the concept of other people. And secondly, one has the 
concept of other people only if one can identify them. From these two premises, it 
follows that one has the concept of oneself only if one can identify other people. 
When these two premises are so combined, the result is indeed of a conceptual 
and an epistemological nature. Both Kim and Ayer deny that to have the concept 
of oneself, one must be able to identify other people. I grant that this is a very 
natural objection to make, but they are objecting to the wrong premise here. 
Contrary to what they think, they are not in fact challenging Strawson’s first 
premise, or the epistemological point that they mistakenly think the first premise 
is also making. This premise makes no such point. Strawson has emphasized that 
“The main point here [referring to the first premise] is a purely logical one”6. 
What Kim and Ayer are objecting to, generally speaking, is the view that one 
must be able to identify instances of a certain concept to count as possessing this 
concept. But this would be to dispute Strawson’s second premise: the claim that 
one has the concept of other people only if one can identify them. It is because 
they do not agree with this premise that they disagree that having the concept of 
oneself is in turn necessarily dependent on being able to identify other people. 
Kim and Ayer, in disputing Strawson’s first premise because they think it makes 
both a conceptual and an epistemological point, have misunderstood the first 
premise and neglected the role played by the second. This mistake must be 
avoided, hence I take some time to clarify it.  
But that said, I must concede that it is an understandable mistake to make. 
The first premise, in its original statement, is this: one can ascribe states of 
                                                          
6 P. F. Strawson, ‘Persons’, Individuals, (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 99. 
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consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. Strawson’s use of 
the expression ‘can ascribe’ is, indeed, ambiguous between a conceptual reading, 
i.e. ‘can meaningfully ascribe’, and an epistemic one, i.e. ‘can justifiably ascribe’. 
Given the shades of ambiguity, it is possible to equivocate between the two and 
misinterpret the first premise as stating that one can meaningfully ascribe states of 
consciousness to oneself only if one can justifiably ascribe them to others.7 Read 
as such, the first premise would indeed seem to have both a conceptual and an 
epistemological nature. This is, of course, not the reading that Strawson intends. 
What he means to say is that one can meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness 
to oneself only if one can also meaningfully ascribe them to others. In other 
words, one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of others. I 
rephrased Strawson’s argument in my introduction precisely to avoid these 
ambiguities and sharpen what I take him to be saying. Properly understood, the 
first premise is a purely logical one. In the next chapter, I will examine why it is 
neccesary for one to be able to identify others in order to have the concept of 
them. This is what Strawson claims in his second premise. I concede that any 
worry over this assertion is natural. But this chapter, with its emphasis on the first 
premise, is not the right place to discuss it. It will, however, be addressed duly.  
 
III) The First Premise and the Generality Constraint 
The first premise of Strawson’s argument is a particular expression of a 
larger idea which Gareth Evans calls ‘the generality constraint’. Evans comes up 
                                                          
7 This is not the only possible misinterpretation of Strawson’s original first premise, as one shall 
see in the next chapter.  
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with the generality constraint as he studies “the nature of our conceivings”.8 He 
writes:  
It seems to me that there must be a sense in which thoughts are structured. The 
thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry 
is happy, and the thought that John is happy has something in common with the 
thought that John is sad.9 
 
He holds that “there is one fundamental constraint that must be observed in all 
our reflections”, and this is the generality constraint.10 It is a constraint on the 
concept of a particular – in so far as a particular should be able to have different 
properties – and the concept of a property – in so far as a property should be 
attributable to different particulars.11 In other words, the generality constraint is a 
constraint, at the very least, on all thoughts of the subject-predicate form ‘a is F’. 
Examples of such thoughts are the thought that John is happy, the thought that the 
ball is round, and the thought that Edison invented the lightbulb, etc. The subject-
expression standing in place of ‘a’ refers to a certain particular. In the examples 
just cited, the subject-expression ‘John’, ‘the ball’ and ‘Edison’ refer to the 
person, John; the object, a particular ball; and the inventor, Edison, respectively. 
And the predicate standing in place of ‘F’ refers to a property. In the same 
examples, the properties in question are that of happiness, roundness, and having 
invented the lightbulb. It is a feature of our conceptual framework that to grasp 
any thought of the subject-predicate form, i.e., the form ‘a is F’, one must have 
both the concepts of the particular and the property in question. For example, to 
                                                          
8 G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 100 
9 Ibid, p. 100 
10 Ibid, p. 100 
11 The generality constraint, however, is not a constraint on all concepts. Concepts which are not 
that of a particular or of a property, such as the concept of time, the concept of space, the concept 
of infinity, etc do not fall under the generality constraint. All my discussion henceforth about the 
generality constraint will not pertain to these concepts mentioned.  
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grasp the thought that John is happy, one must have the concept of John, and the 
concept of happiness. This is part of what it means to say that our thoughts are 
structured. If one does not have either or both of the concepts of John and of 
happiness, then one would not be able to grasp the thought that John is happy. A 
necessary part of the concept of a particular is that it should be able to take on 
different properties. For example, John can be happy, John can be sad, John can 
be tall, John can be heavy, etc. We can attribute different properties to John. And 
a necessary part of the concept of a property is that it should be attributable to 
different particulars. For instance, we can attribute happiness to John, to Harry, or 
to Kerry: John can be happy, Harry can be happy, and Kerry can be happy too. 
Many individuals can, at least in principle, satisfy the concept of being happy. I 
have already pointed out that grasping a thought of the subject-predicate form 
necessarily requires having both the concepts of the particular and the property in 
question. And to have the concept of a particular, it is necessary to understand 
that a particular should be able to have different properties. Likewise, to have the 
concept of a property, it is necessary to understand that it should be attributable to 
different particulars. So, to grasp any thought of the subject-predicate form, it is 
necessary to understand that many different predicates can be ascribed to the 
subject in question; and that the predicate concerned can also be ascribed to 
various subjects. If one fails to understand this, then one would not count as 
having grasped the given thought. This is the idea behind Evans’ generality 
constraint.  
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If we hold that the subject’s understanding of ‘Fa’ and his understanding of ‘Gb’ 
are structured, we are committed to the view that the subject will also be able to 
understand the sentences ‘Fb’ and ‘Ga’.12 
 
In other words, according to the generality constraint, to be able to grasp the 
thoughts that a is F, and that b is G entails being able to grasp the thoughts that a 
is G, and that b is F. Evans illustrates:  
There simply could not be a person who could entertain the thought that John is 
happy and the thought that Harry is friendly, but who could not entertain – who 
was conceptually debarred from entertaining – the thought that John is friendly, 
and the thought that Harry is happy.13 
 
If there is such a person who claims that he can grasp the thoughts that John is 
happy and that Harry is friendly, but claims that he cannot, even in principle, 
grasp the thoughts that John is friendly and that Harry is happy, then we would 
not take him to have understood the concepts of happiness and friendliness (or 
perhaps the concepts of the particulars, John and Harry). Evans explains this with 
the concept of happiness: 
Someone who thinks that John is happy must, as we might say, have the idea of a 
happy man – a situation instantiated in the case of John (he thinks), but in no 
way tied to John for its instantiation.14 
 
The same can be said of the concept of a person. The concept of a person is in no 
way tied to any specific individual for its instantiation. It is in theory possible that 
any individual can be a person. According to the generality constraint, the 
concept of a person is genuine if and only if it can in principle be meaningfully 
applied to various individuals. So, if I am able to grasp the thought that I am a 
person, I am committed to being able to grasp the thought, among others, that 
John is a person, for example.  Anyone whose concept of a person cannot be 
                                                          
12 Ibid, p. 101. Note however that Evans does not give any explicit statement of the generality 
constraint, so I will talk around it, just as Evans did, by capturing the idea that it is trying to 
convey. 
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meaningfully applied to various individuals, even in principle, would fall afoul of 
the generality constraint. His concept of a person would then not be a genuine 
one. Strawson expresses the generality constraint in this way:  
the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable 
individuals of which the predicate can be significantly [my italics], though not 
necessarily truly, affirmed.15 
 
This brings us to what is meant here by a concept being significantly, or 
meaningfully, applied. I think both Strawson and Evans take this to mean that the 
application of the concept is literally sensible. A sentence, or a concept, that is 
significant or meaningful on this reading just is a sentence/concept that possesses 
literal sense. In other words, one can understand this sentence/concept in a literal 
manner. The generality constraint, as Strawson and Evans express it, is saying 
that a concept is genuine if and only if it is literally sensible to apply this concept 
to various individuals. 16 If the thought that I am a person is literally sensible to 
me, then I must hold that the thought that, say, John is a person, is literally 
sensible too. Put another way, if the concept of myself is to be genuine at all, then 
I must also have the concept of other people.  
Given that Strawson’s first premise is a particular expression of the 
generality constraint, one way to dispute the first premise is to dispute the 
generality constraint. If the Cartesian can show that the generality constraint is 
wrong, then he may not have to accept Strawson’s first premise either. A relevant 
way for the Cartesian to challenge the generality constraint is to question whether 
it is necessary for all genuine concepts to satisfy the generality constraint. In other 
                                                                                                                                                              
13 Ibid, p. 103 
14 Ibid, p. 103 
15 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 99, footnote 1. Evans development of the generality constraint is 
partly based on the works of his teacher, P. F. Strawson.  
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words, are there any concepts that fail to meet the generality constraint but seem 
no less genuine? I will turn to this in a moment. But for now, I would like to 
digress a little to point out that there are concerns about the generality constraint 
that are independent from its relation to Strawson’s argument against 
Cartesianism. A brief outline of one such issue is this. Recall that the generality 
constraint claims that to be able to grasp the thoughts that a is F, and that b is G, 
one is committed to being able to grasp the thoughts that a is G, and that b is F. 
But there seem to be some counterexamples to this rule. For instance, I can easily 
understand the sentences (1) ‘Kerry is sad’, and (2) ‘7 is a prime number’. But the 
sentences (3) ‘Kerry is a prime number’ and (4) ‘7 is sad’ do not seem to make 
any literal sense to me. Does this then entail that I do not understand sentences (1) 
and (2)? If the generality constraint is right, then indeed that would be the 
conclusion. And yet that is a fantastic conclusion to hold, thereby casting doubt 
on the generality constraint. It is in light of these cases that Evans qualifies, in a 
footnote, that the generality constraint is subjected to “a proviso about the 
categorial appropriateness of the predicates to the subjects”.17 To the above 
purported counterexamples, Evans would reply that persons and numbers are 
simply not the types of things to which it is literally sensible to apply 
mathematical and emotive concepts respectively. The fact that sentences (3) and 
(4) possess no literal sense is due to a violation of categorial appropriateness, and 
hence poses no threat to my understanding of the concepts in question. The 
generality constraint, Evans qualifies, is subjected to certain categorial restrictions 
on the match between subject and predicate types. But within the appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                              
16 The idea of literal sense will become clearer, as the chapter proceeds.  
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types of subject-predicate pairing, the generality constraint holds. However, there 
are also objections to Evans’ qualified view. Some philosophers argue that no 
such categorial restrictions should be placed on the generality constraint. One of 
the reasons for this view is that sentences such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’, 
and ‘Experience is a poor teacher’ also seem to have violated the rule of 
categorial appropriateness and are literally senseless, but they do not seem to be 
senseless per se. Generally speaking, not all figurative speech acts that violate the 
rule of categorial appropriateness are senseless per se. This leads some 
philosophers to maintain that the generality constraint should not be a qualified 
one. It should not be concerned merely with literal sense, but rather, the idea of 
sense, more broadly construed, so that it can accommodate figurative speech acts 
like the above. The issue in contention here, and others about the generality 
constraint that I have not mentioned, is interesting and worth pursuing in its own 
right. But these larger issues lie beyond the scope of my thesis because they have 
no direct relevance to Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism. Even if one 
were to fault the generality constraint on these grounds, it would not help the 
Cartesian in relation to Strawson’s criticism. Hence, I side-step them and point 
readers to the existing literature should they wish to take them up.18 My focus is 
on how the Cartesian may dispute the generality constraint, and whether he can 
reject Strawson’s first premise by doing so. I will argue that the Cartesian fails to 
challenge both the first premise and the generality constraint. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
17 See Evans (1982), op. cit., p. 101, footnote 17. 
18 See, for example, E. Camp, ‘The Generality Constraint and Categorial Restrictions’, in The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 215, (Apr 2004); C. Travis, ‘On Constraints of Generality’, 
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IV) Uniquely Applicable Predicates 
The generality constraint states that the concept of a person is genuine if 
and only if it is literally sensible to apply it to a range of individuals. However, it 
may not be entirely clear what it is for an application of a concept to be literally 
sensible. Put another way, it is not clear whether or not a concept has satisfied, or 
fallen afoul of, the generality constraint. Also, it may not be obvious to the 
Cartesian why the concept of a person must satisfy the generality constraint to 
begin with. I will address these issues from this section forth. I aim to clarify how 
a concept can be said to have met, or failed, the generality constraint. Unless that 
is clear, the Cartesian may find ways of objecting to the generality constraint 
which are really more of a misunderstanding of the constraint than a genuine 
objection against it. Once we better understand the generality constraint, we will 
also see why the Cartesian will find it very unprofitable to quarrel with the first 
premise of Strawson’s argument.  
 According to the generality constraint, a concept is genuine if and only if 
it is literally sensible to apply the concept to a range of distinguishable 
individuals. A possible counterexample to this view, for a critic of the generality 
constraint, is the concept expressed by a uniquely applicable predicate. By a 
‘uniquely applicable predicate’, I am referring to one such as the predicate ‘is 
identical to Descartes’. The concept expressed by this predicate is a concept that 
only one individual can in principle satisfy. Only Descartes can be identical to 
Descartes; no one else can be identical to Descartes. To utter the sentence 
‘Strawson is identical to Descartes’ would be to utter a falsehood. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
in Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94, (1994); and A. Roos, ‘An Objection to Gareth 
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concept of being identical to Descartes seems to be a genuine one. A Cartesian 
may try to use this as a counterexample to the generality constraint. He may argue 
that, contrary to what it claims, a genuine concept need not be one that is literally 
sensible to apply to a range of individuals. He maintains that the concepts 
expressed by uniquely applicable predicates are genuine, even though he 
presumes it is not literally sensible to apply them to a range of individuals, since 
only one individual can in principle satisfy these concepts. If the generality 
constraint is wrong in this way, then there may be room for the Cartesian to claim 
that his concept of a person is genuine even if it does not possess any literal sense 
to apply this concept to individuals other than himself.  
 The first thing to note about such a response is that the Cartesian who 
makes it is not a traditional Cartesian. A traditional Cartesian would not want to 
liken his concept of a person to that expressed by a uniquely applicable predicate. 
He would not want to hold that it is literally senseless for him to apply this 
concept to other individuals. In other words, he would not want to claim that he 
does not even have the concept of other people. He would maintain that he has 
such a concept, it is just that he does not know whether anything satisfies that 
concept. That is, the most that a traditional Cartesian would concede is that he has 
an epistemological problem of other minds: he does not know whether other 
minds exist; but he would not concede that he has a conceptual one as well. A 
traditional Cartesian would maintain that he has at least the concept, even if not 
the knowledge, of other minds. Therefore, it would not be beneficial to a 
traditional Cartesian to reject the generality constraint, and accordingly to reject 
                                                                                                                                                              
Evans’ Account of Self-Identity’, in Ratio, New Series, Vol. 17, (Jun 2004)  
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Strawson’s first premise, by likening his concept of a person to that expressed by 
a uniquely applicable predicate.19  
 However, it is still worthwhile to study the case of uniquely applicable 
predicates because it helps us to get clear on the generality constraint. 
Presumably, uniquely applicable predicates challenge the generality constraint 
because the concepts expressed by these predicates are genuine even though they 
seem to have failed this constraint. The critic maintains that the concept of being 
identical to Descartes, for example, can be satisfied by only one individual in 
principle, namely, Descartes, and so it is not literally sensible to apply this 
predicate to other individuals. To him, this concept has fallen afoul of the 
generality constraint but it remains no less genuine. Therefore, he claims, this 
constraint must be wrong. There are several ways to defend the generality 
constraint against this objection. One is to deny that the concepts expressed by 
uniquely applicable predicates fall within the scope of the generality constraint. 
The generality constraint is a constraint on the concept of a property (and also the 
concept of a particular), but when one utters the sentence (5) ‘Descartes is 
identical to Descartes’, one is not attributing a property to Descartes in the way 
that one is when one utters (6) ‘Descartes is a famous philosopher’. In (6), one is 
attributing to Descartes the property of being a famous philosopher, but in (5), 
one is merely expressing a statement of identity. Even though both sentences (5) 
and (6) are of the same grammatical form, one is not predicating anything of 
Descartes when one utters (5). According to this line of defense, given that the 
generality constraint is a constraint on the concept of a property, and the concept 
                                                          
19 I will later consider the case where a Cartesian would be prepared to claim that he does not have 
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expressed by a uniquely applicable predicate is deemed not to be that of a 
property, the case of uniquely applicable predicates therefore does not count as a 
counterexample to the constraint.  
 I prefer not to take this line of defence because some concepts expressed 
by certain uniquely applicable predicates seem to be concepts of properties. For 
example, let something be a Van Gogh if and only if it is painted by Vincent Van 
Gogh.20 With this stipulation, the predicate ‘has painted a Van Gogh’ would 
count as a uniquely applicable predicate because it is in principle impossible for 
anyone else but Van Gogh to satisfy the concept expressed by this predicate. Only 
Van Gogh could have painted a Van Gogh, defined as such. But unlike the 
sentence ‘Descartes is identical to Descartes’, when one utters ‘Van Gogh has 
painted a Van Gogh’, one does seem to be attributing a certain property to the 
artist, Van Gogh – that of having painted a Van Gogh – and not merely 
expressing a statement of identity. The concept of having painted a Van Gogh, in 
this case, is, arguably, the concept of a property, and should thus fall within the 
scope of the generality constraint. But since this concept remains genuine even 
though it has allegedly failed to satisfy the generality constraint, it would seem to 
be a counterexample. 
 I think a more promising response can be made to these purported 
counterexamples. One can grant that the concepts expressed by uniquely 
applicable predicates indeed fall within the scope of the generality constraint. 
However, one can argue that the critic is mistaken in thinking these concepts have 
                                                                                                                                                              
the concept of other people.  
20 I owe this example to the work of my classmate, Jasmine Ng. See H. C. Ng, The Conceptual 
Problem of Other Minds, Honours Thesis, National University of Singapore, (2002).  
 37
failed to meet the constraint. And this mistake arises from a misunderstanding of 
it. The generality constraint states that a concept is genuine if and only if it is 
literally sensible to apply it to a range of individuals. But there is a difference 
between saying that it is literally sensible to apply a concept to an individual and 
saying that the concept is satisfied by that individual. A concept can be applied in 
a literally sensible way without being satisfied. For example, the concept of green 
snow is literally sensible. The sentence ‘That is green snow’ possesses literal 
sense, though the proposition is just false because there is, in fact, no such thing 
as green snow. But the fact that we can tell this proposition is false shows that we 
have understood its literal meaning. So, the concept of green snow surely is, at the 
very least, literally sensible, even though, as it stands, nothing in this world 
satisfies this concept. The generality constraint states only that a concept is 
genuine if and only if it is literally sensible to apply it to a range of individuals. 
But the fact that it is literally sensible to apply a concept to a range of individuals 
does not entail that this concept is also in principle satisfiable by various 
individuals. The concept of having painted a Van Gogh is a case in point. Even 
though there is in principle only one individual who can satisfy this concept, 
namely, the artist Van Gogh, it is still literally sensible to apply this concept to 
other individuals besides Van Gogh. For example, the thought that Patrine has 
painted a Van Gogh surely is at least literally sensible, only that it is, sadly, false - 
and necessarily false. That one can tell this is such an unfortunate falsehood 
already shows that the thought in question possesses literal sense. Similarly, the 
concept of being identical to Descartes can also be applied to various individuals 
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in a literally sensible way, although it can in principle be satisfied by only one – 
the philosopher Descartes. The concepts expressed by uniquely applicable 
predicates, contrary to what the critic thinks, fulfil the generality constraint 
because it is literally sensible to apply them to a range of individuals. It is 
therefore no surprise that these concepts are also genuine.  
 But suppose that the critic opposes this understanding of the generality 
constraint. Suppose he points out that the generality constraint is more commonly 
understood as stating that a concept is genuine if and only if it can in principle be 
satisfied by various individuals. On this understanding, the concepts expressed by 
uniquely applicable predicates would have failed the generality constraint since 
only one individual can in principle satisfy these concepts. That these concepts 
remain genuine despite this would then challenge the generality constraint, the 
critic maintains. My reply to this view is that the critic is simply not addressing 
the constraint that Strawson and Evans have in mind. Recall that Strawson writes:  
the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable 
individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily 
truly [my italics], affirmed. 
 
To Strawson and Evans, the generality constraint is not asserting that a concept is 
genuine if and only if it can in principle be satisfied by various individuals. The 
critic certainly is free to consider this, or any other, interpretation of the generality 
constraint. But simply in offering an alternative reading, he has not shown in any 
way that the generality constraint, as Strawson and Evans understand it, is false. 
On their understanding, there is no danger that the concepts expressed by 
uniquely applicable predicates would be deemed empty.  
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Thus far, I have clarified that the case of uniquely applicable predicates 
does not threaten the generality constraint because the concepts expressed by 
these predicates are literally sensible. I have also noted that even if the generality 
constraint were to be so challenged, that is, even if it is indeed literally senseless 
to apply these said concepts to more than one individual, it would not have 
benefitted the traditional Cartesian. This is because he would not want to hold 
that it is literally senseless for him to apply the concept of a person to other 
individuals. The traditional Cartesian has the concept of other people, he just 
doubts whether anything satisfies this concept. To claim that he does not even 
have this concept would be a big concession for him to make. I will later consider 
the case where a more radical Cartesian would be prepared to make just such a 
concession. But for now, one more clarification needs to be made about the 
generality constraint.  
 
V) On Being Literally Sensible to Apply a Concept to a Range of 
Individuals 
 The generality constraint states that a concept is genuine if and only if it is 
literally sensible to apply it to a range of individuals. But what does it mean to 
say that it is literally sensible to apply a concept to a range of individuals? There 
are many concepts of which it is literally sensible to apply them to a range of 
individuals at the same time. Take, for example, the concept of owning a bicycle. 
The thought that various people own bicycles at any given time possesses literal 
sense. And many people do, in fact, own bicycles at any given time, so this 
concept is also satisfied by many people simultaneously. But there are also some 
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concepts of which it is literally sensible to apply them to various individuals, but 
no more than one individual can in principle satisfy these concepts at any given 
time. Examples of such concepts are that of standing on a particular spot, and that 
of being alone in this room. I can conceive of myself standing on a particular 
spot, call it ‘X’, just as I can conceive of John standing on X, Harry standing on X 
etc. Likewise, I can conceive of myself being alone in this room, call it ‘Y’, as 
easily as I can conceive of Kerry being alone in Y. It is literally sensible to apply 
both these concepts to various individuals, but no more than one individual can 
satisfy these concepts at any given time, on pain of contradiction. It is necessarily 
the case that at most one thing can satisfy the concept of standing on a particular 
spot since no two things can occupy the same spot at the same time. Similarly, at 
most one person can satisfy the concept of being alone in this room at any given 
time, on pain of contradiction. Yet, these concepts are literally sensible. How then 
does the generality constraint account for such concepts? Do they pose as 
counterexamples to it? I think they do not. There are two ways to see this. Firstly, 
one can give the same reply that one made to the case of uniquely applicable 
predicates, and that is to highlight the difference between saying that it is literally 
sensible to apply a concept to an individual (or various individuals), and saying 
that the individual (or individuals concerned) satisfies that concept. For instance, 
the sentence ‘John and Harry are standing on the same particular spot now’ is at 
least literally sensible, although it is also false. The fact that we can tell the 
statement is false shows that we have understood its literal meaning. Likewise, 
the sentence ‘Each of John and Mary is alone in this room now’ possesses literal 
sense, but this is not to say that both John and Mary simultaneously satisfy the 
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concept of being alone in this room. Therefore, given that it is literally sensible to 
apply these concepts to various individuals at the same time, even if they cannot 
be correspondingly satisfied, they are therefore genuine and do not count as 
counterexamples to the generality constraint.  
But there is another more substantial way to understand how these 
concepts are literally sensible even though they are not in principle satisfiable by 
a range of individuals at the same time. These concepts are literally sensible 
because we apply them in relation to time. At some time, one might say ‘John is 
standing on X’. And at another time, one might say ‘Harry is standing on X’. But 
one does not take both statements to hold true simultaneously. A similar 
explanation runs for the concept of being alone in this room. I can be alone in this 
room, Y, just as Kerry can be alone in Y. And whatever time at which we are 
respectively alone in Y, they are not one and the same. A concept is genuine if 
and only if it is literally sensible to apply this concept to a range of individuals. 
But the fact that it is literally sensible to apply a certain concept to a range of 
individuals does not entail that various individuals can in principle satisfy the 
concept at the same time. The generality constraint does not require for a genuine 
concept to be in principle satisfiable by various individuals simultaneously. So, 
the fact that no more than one individual can in principle satisfy certain concepts 
at any given time should not render them empty. The concept of being alone in 
this room, for example, remains genuine even though it is in principle impossible 
for more than one individual to satisfy it at the same time. 
 The type of concepts I have considered above highlights what the 
generality constraint is not saying. It is not saying that a concept is genuine if and 
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only if more than one individual can in principle satisfy this concept at the same 
time. So, concepts such as that of standing on a particular spot, and of being alone 
in this room do not count as counterexamples to the generality constraint. But I 
should also point out that these concepts do not help the Cartesian defend himself 
against Strawson. There is no analogy between the Cartesian concept of a person 
and these concepts I have just considered. Hence, the Cartesian would not be 
using them to challenge the generality constraint. I dwelt on them only to help us 
get clearer on what the generality constraint is.  
 
VI) The Case of the Conceptual Solipsist 
  Lastly, I will take up the response that a more radical Cartesian would 
make to Strawson’s first premise that one has the concept of oneself only if one 
has the concept of others. I have stressed that the generality constraint states only 
that a concept is genuine if and only if it is literally sensible to apply it to a range 
of individuals. That a concept is so genuine does not entail that it can in principle 
be satisfied by more than one individual at the same time. Concepts which cannot 
in principle be satisfied by various individuals simultaneously are no less 
genuine. Then, what about concepts which can in principle be satisfied by only 
one individual, but at various times? More interestingly, what about concepts of 
which it is literally sensible to apply to only one individual, but at various times? 
Would the latter type of concepts also count as genuine? An example of such a 
concept is that of a person for a more radical Cartesian. Previously, I have 
mentioned that the more radical Cartesian is one who would be prepared to 
concede that he does not have the concept of other people. This Cartesian would 
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grant not only that it is in principle impossible for any other individual to satisfy 
his concept of a person, but also that it is literally senseless for him to apply this 
concept to anything but himself. He has no such concept of other people. Such a 
Cartesian, also known as the conceptual solipsist21, would however want to 
maintain that his concept of his own self can be genuine without presupposing the 
concept of other people. And if so, he would have shown it to be false that one 
has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. There may 
then be room for him to maintain that he has the concept of his own self, even if 
he were to concede that he does not have the concept of other people. His purpose 
of making such a retort is to block at least Strawson’s charge that the Cartesian 
does not even have the concept of his own self, albeit at the hefty price of giving 
up the concept of other people. But how then does the conceptual solipsist go 
about arguing that his concept of himself is so genuine? By arguing that it is 
literally sensible to apply the concept of a person to himself, and only himself, at 
various time-slices. For example, the conceptual solipsist claims that he has the 
concept of himself feeling hungry at such-and-such time. At some later time, he 
has the concept of himself thinking of how to satisfy his hunger. And 
subsequently, he has the concept of himself wondering what to do after his 
hunger has been satiated. The conceptual solipsist argues that since he has these 
various concepts of himself at various times, his concept of his own self therefore 
satisfies the condition of being applicable to a ‘range’ of individuals in a literally 
sensible way – in this case, the ‘range’ of individuals is himself at various time-
                                                          
21 I am not however implying that only Cartesians are ever conceptual solipsists. Though there 
seems to be little reason for a non-Cartesian to be driven into conceptual solipsism, it cannot be 
ruled out as a possibility.  
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slices. The generality he has in mind here is more expansive than what is typically 
understood. He holds that a concept which can be applied (in a literally sensible 
way) to only oneself, but at various time-slices, also satisfies the condition of 
generality in its application. And since, he presumes, his concept of his own self 
is generally applicable in this sense without presupposing the concept of other 
people, he argues it is therefore not the case that one has the concept of oneself 
only if one has the concept of other people. He maintains his concept of his own 
self is nonetheless genuine even if he concedes that he does not have the concept 
of others.  
 I have argued that rejecting Strawson’s first premise in this way, if it 
works at all, is not helpful to the traditional Cartesian. The traditional Cartesian 
would not want to maintain that he does not have the concept of other people. The 
traditional Cartesian takes seriously the epistemological problem of other minds. 
This concerns the issue of how we know that other minds, or other people, exist. 
The Cartesian agrees that we have direct acquaintance with only our own 
experience, we have no such acquaintance with others’ experience. If so, then it 
must be at least conceivable that other people do not have the experience that we 
do, despite the suggestions of his behaviour. And if it is at least conceivable that 
other people are not conscious in the way that we are, then we seem to have no 
good grounds to believe that other people are conscious, or that other people 
exist. The epistemological problem of other minds is a meaningful one to the 
Cartesian. But its very meaningfulness presupposes that the Cartesian already has 
the concept of other people. If he does not have this concept, then the question of 
whether he is justified in believing in the existence of other people will not even 
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arise for him. Hence, the concept of other people, like the concept of oneself, is 
one that is taken for granted in the traditional Cartesian framework. To now adopt 
the conceptual solipsist’s response and deny that he has any such concept of other 
people will not be a very attractive route to the traditional Cartesian, even if it 
may earn him the concept of his own self. In going this route, it is arguable that 
the traditional Cartesian would already have ceded a lot to Strawson. It is 
unpalatable enough for him to concede that he does not even have the concept of 
other people.  
 But there is a more serious problem with this route of retreat, and that is 
even if a conceptual solipsist is willing to give up the concept of other people, he 
still fails to keep the concept of himself. This is because by conceding that he has 
no such concept of other people, or the concept of other people’s experience, he 
removes the function that the first-person pronoun and possessive plays in the 
language. For example, when a speaker uses the expression ‘my pain’, the first-
person possessive, ‘my’, serves to distinguish the pain to which he is referring, 
namely, that which belongs to the speaker, from pains that belong to other people 
and to which he is not referring. Similarly, when a speaker utters ‘I am hungry’, 
the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, serves to distinguish the individual to whom the 
speaker is referring, namely, himself, from people who are not himself, i.e., other 
people. The first-person pronoun and its associated possessives, i.e. ‘I’, ‘my’, 
‘me’, and ‘mine’, are significant in the language only if they are juxtaposed 
against third-person pronouns and their related possessives. That is, there is a 
need to pick out my pain only if there is a need to delineate it from, say, John’s 
pain. In his retort to Strawson, the conceptual solipsist claims that he has the 
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concept of my present pain (referring to his pain) and also the concept of my 
subsequent pain (again referring to his own), without having the concept of other 
people’s pain. But if that is true, then there is little use for the term ‘my’ in his 
retort to begin with. All that he has is the concept of a present pain, as opposed to 
the concept of a later pain. The thought that I am in pain, for the conceptual 
solipsist, will not be literally sensible to him, contrary to what he thinks. The 
first-person pronoun and possessives are empty if they are not understood in 
relation to third-person pronouns and possessives. By conceding that he does not 
have the concept of other people, the conceptual solipsist is giving up that very 
concept only against which the concept of his own self makes any literal sense. 
Hence, if the conceptual solipsist gives up the concept of other people, then the 
concept of his own self must also be accordingly empty. He will still fail to retain 
this concept. This is another way of seeing why Strawson asserts that one has the 
concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. The radical 
Cartesian, i.e. the conceptual solipsist, is mistaken in thinking that his concept of 
his own self remains literally sensible in isolation from the concept of other 
people. The concept of a person must satisfy the generality constraint to count as 
a genuine concept. If the concept of oneself is all that one has, then, in Strawson’s 
words, “all private experiences, all states of consciousness, will be mine, i.e., no 
one’s.”22  
 To recapitulate, the first premise of Strawson’s argument is a particular 
expression of Evans’ generality constraint. The idea behind the generality 
constraint is this: if one can grasp the thought that one is a person, then one is also 
                                                          
22 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 100, my italics. 
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committed to being able to grasp the thought that another is a person. Only if one 
has the concept of other people can one have the concept of oneself. Put another 
way, one’s concept of oneself is genuine only if one’s concept of a person 
satisfies the generality constraint. According to the generality constraint, a 
concept is genuine if and only if it is literally sensible to apply this concept to a 
range of individuals. I have looked at several possible misinterpretations of the 
generality constraint and cautioned against them. I have also examined a more 
radical Cartesian response to Strawson’s first premise and argued that it fails. If 
the radical Cartesian is willing to grant that he does not have the concept of other 
people, then, contrary to what he thinks, his concept of his own self will be 
literally senseless. That is because the concept of oneself possesses literal sense 
only in juxtaposition to the concept of others. Only if there is a need to 
differentiate between a first-person experience and a third-person one is there a 
use for both of these concepts – the first-person and the third-person - in our 
conceptual framework. Without either of one, the other concept is empty as well. 
This is one natural way to understand why Strawson asserts, in the first place, that 
one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. By this 
point, I hope to have persuaded the reader of the strength of this logical premise. 
If any attack is to be made on Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, this is 









This chapter focuses on the second and most controversial premise of Strawson’s 
argument against Cartesianism. The argument is this: Strawson first points out 
that one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. 
And one has the concept of other people only if one can identify them. But one 
cannot identify other people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects 
of experience. Hence, anyone whose concept of other people is essentially that of 
subjects of experience loses the concept of his own self. The essence of the 
Cartesian’s concept of a person is, indeed, that of a subject of experience. 
Strawson therefore concludes that the Cartesian does not even have the concept of 
himself. I clarified in the previous chapter that the first premise should not be 
conflated with the second one – the former is making only a conceptual point and 
read as such, it is hardly controversial. It is the second premise, namely, the claim 
that one has the concept of other people only if one can identify them that one 
would find more objectionable. This premise links a conceptual issue with an 
epistemological one. Generally speaking, the claim is that one counts as having a 
certain concept only if one can identify instances of this concept. It is an in-
principle identification that is at issue here. That is, unless one knows in principle 
how to identify instances of a particular concept, one would not count as having 
that concept. The general concern about this premise is it seems at least 
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conceivable that one can be said to have a certain concept the instances of which 
one may not be able to identify. In other words, the critics think it need not be the 
case, or at least not obviously so, that one must be able to identify instances of a 
particular concept in order to qualify as having that concept. I will address this 
concern in this present chapter.1 In particular, I will examine a thought 
experiment that Ayer puts forth to illustrate this view. I grant that prima facie, it 
seems plausible that it is not necessary for one to be able to identify instances of a 
concept which one claims to have. But I will argue that Ayer’s thought 
experiment has not established that. The view that it is so necessary, though 
seemingly questionable, is not easily undermined, as I will show.  
 After I have defended the second premise of Strawson’s argument, I will 
explain certain implications that the argument has on the traditional problem of 
other minds. This problem is an epistemological one. It is generally agreed that 
the Cartesian faces such a problem. Given that the essence of his concept of a 
person is that of a subject of experience, the question arises as to how he can 
come to identify such a subject. Put another way, how can he know that other 
minds, or egos, exist? I have previously mentioned that if the Cartesian holds on 
to his essential concept of a person, he has not just an epistemological problem of 
other minds, but also a conceptual problem of minds in general. If Strawson’s 
argument is sound, the Cartesian has neither the concept of other people, nor that 
of his own self. According to Strawson, the epistemological and conceptual 
problems of other minds rise and fall together. I will elaborate on this. And 
                                                          
1 I have chosen to focus on the objections raised by A. J. Ayer and C. T. Kim because I find their 
views to be most clearly articulated. See also A. Hylsop, ‘Strawson On Other Minds’, in Other 
Minds, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995) for a more general response to Strawson.  
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finally, I will look at an implication that Strawson’s argument will have, if it is 
sound, on a traditional response to the epistemological problem of other minds. 
That is the argument from analogy. A proponent of the argument from analogy 
justifies his belief in the existence of other minds by drawing an analogy from 
himself. He observes there are certain behaviorial similarities between others and 
himself. Since he knows that he is conscious when he behaves in such-and-such a 
way, he infers that others are conscious too when they behave like so. Many have 
disputed the efficacy of this response to the epistemological problem of other 
minds. Strawson also rejects the argument from analogy, but for a reason wholely 
different from the typical ones. This will be the focus in the final section.  
 
II) Clarifying Ayer’s Thought Experiment 
 The second premise of Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism states 
that one has the concept of other people only if one can, at least in principle, 
identify them. More generally, one would not count as possessing a certain 
concept unless one can in principle identify instances of this concept.2 To be able 
to identify a particular, in this case, just is to be able to pick out, or distinguish, 
that particular among many. For example, a toddler pointing to a certain ball and 
not to a certain book upon suitable prompt suggests that he can identify the ball. 
An eye-witness who puts together a sketch of a criminal on an I.D. kit would 
count as being able to identify the criminal. Strawson holds that unless one can in 
principle pick out instances of a certain concept, one does not have this concept at 
all.  
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 In the article ‘The Concept of a Person’, Ayer uses a certain thought 
experiment to object to the view that one has the concept of oneself only if one 
can identify other people. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this view follows 
from the first and second premises of Strawson’s argument. Ayer tries to illustrate 
that one can still be said to have the concept of oneself even if one cannot identify 
any other people. He asks us to imagine a boy who has been confined to a room 
since infancy. He has no human contact in this room, and is fed by mechanical 
means. This room “contains, in addition to the usual furniture, a number of 
automata”.3 These automata have been cleverly built to resemble human beings in 
significant ways. They look like human beings, and are programmed to respond 
with appropriate behavior and make suitable utterances, just as humans do, when 
presented with different stimuli. “[They] cry out, for example, when [the boy] hits 
them, or retaliates by striking out at him; they can be made to nod or shake their 
heads in answer to his questions, and also to utter certain simple sentences”.4 The 
boy also learns the use of language from a computer program.  
The voice teaches the child the names of the various types of objects in the room; 
it formulates sentences for him to imitate, which are sometimes also responded 
to by the automata. It teaches him his own name, the use of pronouns and 
demonstratives, and the use of words which describe his ‘inner’ states.5 
 
The program also speaks of the automata as if they were conscious and the boy 
learns to apply mental concepts to himself and the automata, but not to objects 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 As it is with the generality constraint, this view does not apply to concepts which are not that of 
a particular or of a property, such as that of time, space and infinity etc. 
3 A. J. Ayer, ‘The Concept of a Person’, in The Concept of a Person (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1963), p. 106 
4 ibid, pp. 106-107 
5 ibid, p. 107 
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such as tables and chairs in the room.6 For example, the boy will say, “I am 
hungry” when he is craving for food, and “He (referring to an automaton) is 
hungry” when he sees the automaton looking for, or wolfing down huge 
mouthfuls of food. He will not say of the tables and chairs that they are hungry. 
The automaton does not, of course, feel any hunger and is not conscious in the 
way that the boy is. But the boy does not know this and has always 
(mis)identified them as people, just as he identifies himself as a person. Ayer 
thinks this thought experiment shows that  
if there were someone who was invariably mistaken in ascribing states of 
consciousness to others, whether because there were no other persons in the 
world or merely because he never encountered any, this would not necessarily 
prevent him from being able to ascribe them to himself.7  
 
In other words, contrary to what Strawson claims, Ayer thinks it is false that one 
has the concept of oneself only if one can identify other people.  
A thing to note before I respond to the thought experiment is that although 
the above view follows from Strawson’s first and second premises, Ayer does not 
seem to delineate between them when he crafts his objections. He does not make 
explicit which of the two premises he is objecting to with his thought experiment. 
Rather, he offers various interpretations of Strawson’s original first premise and 
responds to them accordingly. As originally stated, the first premise is this: one 
can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to 
others. Since the expression ‘can ascribe’ is ambiguous in several ways and 
Strawson himself does not make explicit the sense he is using, it is 
                                                          
6 Raziel Abelson argues that if it is a computer program, and not the automata, that teaches the 
boy the use of language, then he cannot mistake the automata for real persons. This is because 
“the tape-recorded voice cannot get him to see the robots as self-ascribers”. See Raziel Abelson, 
‘Persons, P-Predicates, and Robots’ in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Oct 
1966) for details. (The quote is taken from p. 306 of the article.)  
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understandable that Ayer equivocates among various senses in his response. He 
thinks it is not clear that one can meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness to 
oneself only if one can justifiably do so to others. And even if one is justified in 
ascribing them to others, it does not follow that those ascriptions are true, in 
which case there is also a sense that one cannot truly ascribe states of 
consciousness to others. He writes: 
even if I could not think of myself as a person unless I also thought that I had 
reasons to think the same of others, I could still consistently raise the question 
whether these reasons really did the work that was required of them; and even if 
I were able to decide that they were good reasons, I should still not be bound to 
hold that they were conclusive.8  
 
The thought experiment, for Ayer,  
  
shows not only that one might be able to ascribe experiences to oneself, while 
being invariably mistaken in ascribing them to others, but also that the criteria 
which are taken to be logically adequate for ascribing experiences to others may 
determine no more than that some locution is correct, that in such and such 
conditions this is the proper thing to say; it does not necessarily follow that what 
is said is true.9  
 
In Ayer’s opinion, the behavior that one observes in others may determine at most 
that one is justified in believing that other people exist. But it does not follow 
from this that one’s belief is true. For example, it may be said that the boy is 
justified in believing that the automata are people since by all physical 
appearances and all that he has been taught, there is plausibly no indication 
otherwise. But for Ayer it is certainly not true that they in fact are people. So, he 
thinks the thought experiment illustrates a wedge between a conceptual and an 
epistemological issue. He claims it is not obviously true that one can 
meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness to oneself, i.e. have the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 Ayer (1963), op. cit., p. 106 
8 Ibid, pp. 105-106 
9 Ibid, p. 108 
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oneself, only if one can justifiably ascribe them to others. And even if one can 
justifiably do so to others, it does not entail that such ascriptions are true.  
I think Ayer is misled by the ambiguities in Strawson’s original argument 
to voice the above objections, for the views that he is objecting to are not 
Strawson’s. The sense in which Strawson uses the expression ‘can ascribe’ is the 
conceptual one. I rephrased the argument the way I did to emphasize this and to 
better relate various objections to the argument. Once a distinction is made 
between the conceptual premise, i.e., the first premise that one has the concept of 
oneself only if one has the concept of other people; and the second one: one has 
the concept of other people only if one can identify them, it becomes clearer that 
Ayer would find fault with the latter, since he grants Strawson the former. 
Hereafter, I will reformulate Ayer’s objection and redirect it towards the second 
premise, which is where I think it would be if Strawson’s argument were properly 
understood.  
In this altered light, Ayer could be read as trying to illustrate that one need 
not be able to identify other people in order to count as having the concept of 
them. For it is unclear that the boy is able to identify other people, since he is 
invariably mistaken each time he identifies the automata as such; and yet, Ayer 
maintains, the boy does seem to have the concept of other people and of a person 
in general.  
There is no warrant for assuming that his concept of a person could not be the 
same as ours. He applies it to himself on the basis of his experiences and he 
applies it to the automata on the basis of their behavior, which if they were very 
skilfully constructed, might not appear very different, within their limited field of 
operation, from that of human beings.10  
 
                                                          
10 Ibid, p. 108 
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So, Ayer would hold that even if someone is invariably mistaken in ascribing 
states of consciousness to others, like the boy is, it does not entail that he cannot 
meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness to them, and accordingly, to himself 
as well.  
  
III) Defense of Strawson’s Second Premise 
 Although Ayer’s thought experiment seems quite persuasive, I think it has 
not succeeded in falsifying Strawson’s claim that one has the concept of other 
people only if one can identify them. It is an in-principle identification that is at 
issue here. Strawson means to assert that unless one can in principle identify other 
people, one does not have the concept of them. Anyone who wants to dispute this 
must show that it is at least plausible for one to count as having a certain concept 
even though one cannot in principle identify any instances of that concept. And 
Ayer just has not shown this with his thought experiment. All that he has 
established with it is that the boy has not identified any other person. He clearly 
has not done so since there is no other person to be identified in his artificial 
environment. I can grant that there is a sense in which the boy cannot identify 
other people – the sense that there is no such other person for him to identify. It is 
the same sense in which it is true to say I cannot identify a horse in my room 
because there simply aren’t any horses in my room to be identified.  But it is not 
clear from this that the boy cannot in principle identify any other people. In fact, 
enter a few human beings into the room and there is no reason to suppose that he 
would not also identify them as other people. And he would be right in those 
cases. The likelihood of this scenario shows that the boy can, at least in principle, 
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identify other people. As it stands, the boy cannot do so only in the sense that 
there are no other people for him to pick out. But this is not the relevant sense. 
Since it is not obvious from the thought experiment that the boy cannot identify 
other people in principle, there is little harm in granting that the boy has the 
concept of other people.  
Peter Hacker makes a similar response to Ayer’s thought experiment.11 He 
argues that it has not shown that the boy, who is invariably mistaken in 
identifying other people, is in principle unable to correct his judgment. Ayer 
thinks “there is no warrant for assuming that [the boy’s] concept of a person 
could not be the same as ours”12 and that “there is nothing in this child’s world, as 
we have described it, which would allow him to find out his companions were, or 
were not, automata”.13 But Hacker suggests that these two claims are 
incompatible. He points out that Ayer makes an implicit assumption in his 
thought experiment that the automata are not persons, but Hacker objects that 
“Ayer gives no clear reason why the robots are not in fact persons”.14 Hacker 
grants, for the sake of argument, that “persons are necessarily biochemical 
organisms rather than electrophysical machines”15 and thus allows Ayer to deny 
that the automata are persons on this ground. And since it is part of our concept of 
a person that it is necessarily a biochemical organisim, then it must also be part of 
the boy’s concept of a person, since, as Ayer claims, his concept is no different 
from ours. So, “if the child discovers that his playmates are machines, and 
                                                          
11 See P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Other Minds and Professor Ayer’s Concept of a Person’, in Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, (Mar 1972)  
12 Ayer (1963), op. cit., p. 108 
13 Ibid, p. 108 
14 Hacker (1972), op. cit., p. 347 
15 Ibid, p. 347 
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continues to ascribe states of consciousness to them, and to think of them as 
persons, then he either has a different concept from ours, or has an imperfect 
grasp of our concept.”16 As it stands in the thought experiment, the boy has not 
discovered that the automata are machines and thus mistakenly thinks they are 
organisms. But Hacker points out that  
it is a readily correctable error, and it is not clear that there is nothing in the 
child’s world that would allow him at least in principle to discover that his 
companions are not persons. For whatever test Ayer can emply to show that the 
robots are not persons, the child can in principle at least, employ the same test.17 
 
Hence, according to Hacker, Ayer has not established in his thought experiment 
that the boy cannot in principle correct his mistake. In the same vein, it is not 
clear that he cannot in principle identify other people. Ayer’s thought experiment 
alone is insufficient to falsify the premise that one has the concept of other people 
only if one can (in principle) identify them. 
 On the other hand, there are some persuasive considerations in favour of 
Strawson’s view that unless one can in principle identify instances of a certain 
concept, one would not count as having this concept at all. Strawson points out 
that it is a feature of our ordinary discourse that we are often able, as speakers and 
hearers, to identify for ourselves and for each other the particulars to which we 
are referring. In other words, it is a feature of interpersonal communication that 
both speakers and hearers know the particular(s) that both are talking about. And 
unless both parties know the particular(s) in question, there does not seem to be 
any communication going on, properly speaking. For example, suppose we 
overhear two people talking about George W. Bush and his foreign policies. An 
                                                          
16 Ibid, p. 347 
17 Ibid, p. 347 
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implicit assumption that we would hold is that the two people can, as a matter of 
fact, identify who George W. Bush is. If we think that either one, or both, of them 
cannot in fact do so, then this conversation would already begin to seem rather 
peculiar to us. Now further imagine a scenario whereby a speaker talks about an 
entity, call it ‘X’, but renounces even the theoretical possibility of anyone ever 
identifying X. It is in principle impossible for X to be identified. It is then no 
longer clear that the speaker has made any genuine reference to X, and some 
sense of absurdity must pervade the speaker’s talk about X. If someone 
acknowledges the existence of a class of particulars, say the class of Xs, in his 
conceptual framework, but claims that it is in principle impossible for any Xs to 
be identified, then the concept of Xs would just seem to be empty. It is not a 
genuine concept. Let us consider Ayer’s thought experiment again. Suppose each 
time the boy thinks about the concept of other people, he does not know how to 
identify the individuals that satisfy this concept. That each time he comes into 
contact with another being very much like himself (be it an automaton or a 
human), he invariably does not know what to think of this being. Furthermore, 
suppose that he even thinks it is in principle impossible for him to identify any 
instances of this concept of other people. Would we not be tempted to ask what 
then is his concept of other people? There seems to be no real sense we can make 
of it. It just does not seem genuine. The prima facie absurdity of this scenario 
strongly suggests that unless one can, at least in principle, identify instances of a 
certain concept, one simply does not have this concept at all. Strawson writes:  
It is not merely a happy accident that we are often able, as speakers and hearers, 
to identify the particulars which enter into our discourse. That it should be 
possible to identify particulars of a given type seems a necessary condition of the 
inclusion of that type in our ontology. For what could we mean by claiming to 
 59
acknowledge the existence of a class of particular things and to talk to each other 
about members of this class, if we qualified the claim by adding that it was in 
principle impossible for any one of us to make any other of us understand which 
menber, or members, of this class he was at any time talking about? The 
qualification would seem to stultify the claim. 18 
 
Generally speaking, Strawson thinks, one has the concept of a certain class of 
purported objects, can admit it into our ontology, only if it is at least in principle 
possible for one to identify members of this class. The above quote, I concede is 
not so much an argument for this view, but more of a rhetorical statement about 
the absurdity of denying it. The lack of a closer scrutiny in Individuals is perhaps 
a cause of unease about it, for some may think there are potential 
counterexamples to it. In what follows, I will examine these purported 
counterexamples and argue that while they may be suggestive, they do not 
challenge the view in question. Strawson’s general claim, as I hope to show, is 
not easily refutable.  
 
IV) Purported Counterexamples 
 One way in which a Cartesian may try to dispute the view in question is to 
point out that there are cases in which one is, in fact, unable to pick out members 
of a certain class of purported objects, but one can still be said to have the concept 
of them. Take for example the concept of platinum. I can, rather indisputably, be 
said to have the concept of platinum. I know that it is a silvery-white precious 
metal that has many uses. It can be made into jewellery and is more popular than 
conventional gold and silver. That I can produce such information shows that I 
surely have at least some concept of platinum, that this concept is not empty to 
                                                          
18 P. F. Strawson, ‘Persons’, Individuals, (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 16 
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me. And yet I do not have the ablity to identify platinum. I am unable to 
distinguish platinum from white gold from silver. Nor can I tell that an object is 
made of platinum, as opposed to any other metal. So, there is certainly a sense in 
which I cannot identify instances of platinum. This is a slightly different case 
from Ayer’s thought experiment. In the latter, the boy cannot identify other 
people in that there are no such people for him to identify. But in this case, I may 
well be surrounded by platinum objects – so there are such instances for me to 
identify – but I just do not have the ability to pick them out. Might this then 
suggest that it is not necessary for one to be able to identify instances of platinum 
to count as having this concept? And if so, a Cartesian may liken his concept of 
other people to that of platinum and claim that he cannot identify other people in 
the same sense that I cannot identify platinum – there may well be other people 
around him, but, as a matter of fact, he does not have the ability to identify them. 
Yet, just as I have the concept of platinum, he maintains so too does he have the 
concept of other people. Strawson’s second premise is false to this Cartesian.  
 I think a reply can easily be made to this purported counterexample, which 
is not very different from my response to Ayer’s thought experiment. We should 
bear in mind that Strawson is talking about in-principle identification when he 
asserts his second premise. His claim, properly understood, is that one has the 
concept of other people only if one can in principle identify them. In the case of 
Ayer’s thought experiment, it may, in fact, be true that the boy has not 
encountered any other people so there are no such people for him to identify. But 
it is not true that it is in principle impossible for him to encounter such people. 
For example, he may one day be released from his captivity and come into 
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contact with real people for him to identify. Likewise for the concept of platinum, 
it is not true that I cannot in principle identify platinum. It may be true that as it 
is, I have no such ability. However it is certainly in principle possible for me to 
acquire the ability. For example, I can pay a skilled jeweller to teach me to 
identify a platinum ring. Or I can read up Chemistry textbooks on experiments 
that I can conduct to help me identify the element. I have many ways to acquire 
the ability to identify platinum. Like Ayer’s thought experiment, this purported 
counterexample does not show that I am in principle unable to identify instances 
of the concept in question. Hence, it does not falsify Strawson’s general claim 
that one has the concept of a certain class of purported object only if one can in 
principle identify members of this class. The Cartesian also cannot reject 
Strawson’s second premise on this ground.  
 The concept of platinum is one of which there are known instances. But 
not all of our concepts have known instances. There are many concepts that we 
have of which no instances have yet been identified. Consider the concept of 
green snow. We certainly have this concept but we have not come across any 
snow that is green. As a matter of fact, nothing in this world satisfies the concept 
of green snow, so there is a sense in which we cannot identify green snow – there 
is no such thing to be identified. But we can certainly claim to have this concept 
Another commentator, Kim, may be considering such concepts when he retorts 
that:  
The principle to which Strawson may appeal, namely, the principle that in order 
to have a general concept one must know that there actually are instances other 
than the single one he is acquainted with is a false dogma. In fact, it is not even 
the case that every intelligible general concept must have known instances. There 
is no reason why a Cartesian mind may not recognize itself as an instance of the 
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concept of a subject of experiences, where no other subjects of experiences have 
yet been identified.19  
 
Kim thinks the Cartesian may hold that his concept of other people is like our 
concept of green snow. Even though there may be no such other people for the 
Cartesian to identify – and in this sense he cannot identify them – he can still 
quite legitimately claim to have the concept of other people, just as we can 
equally claim to have the concept of green snow.20 Hence, the Cartesian retorts, it 
is not true that one has the concept of other people only if one can identify them.  
 This objection does not work. Kim has misunderstood Strawson when he 
thinks that Strawson is appealing to the “false dogma” that “in order to have a 
general concept one must know that there actually are instances other than the 
single one he is acquainted with”. Strawson is appealing to no such idea. Kim 
might have thought otherwise because he is misled, like Ayer, by the original 
statement of Strawson’s first premise: one can ascribe states of consciousness to 
oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. Since the expression “can ascribe” 
is ambiguous in many ways, it is possible for Kim to have misread Strawson as 
claiming that one can meaningfully ascribe states of consciousness to oneself, 
have the concept of oneself, only if one can actually ascribe such states to 
others.21 This can be seen when Kim writes:  
There is a stronger thesis implied by [Strawson’s first premise], to the effect that 
. . . in order for one to attribute experiences to oneself, one must have the general 
                                                          
19 C. T. Kim, ‘Cartesian Dualism and The Unity of a Mind’, in Mind, New Series, Vol. 80, No. 
319, (Jul 1971), p. 340. As discussed in chapter 1, by a “general” concept, Kim is referring to a 
concept that satisfies the generality constraint. In other words, it is a genuine concept of which it 
is literally sensible to apply to a range of individuals.  
20 This is not to say that all Cartesian sceptics about other minds will claim that there are no 
known instances of other minds. A Cartesian can be an other-mind sceptic by claiming that he 
knows that other minds exist, but not how he comes to know this. However, it is at least possible 
for a Cartesian sceptic to hold the former position.  
21 In reading the first premise as such, Kim has also mistaken it to make a conceptual and an 
epistemological point.  
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concept of a subject of experiences, and that in order for one to have the general 
concept of a subject of experiences, one must be actually able to identify 
instances of this concept other than oneself.22  
 
If this is what Kim makes of Strawson’s position, then it is understandable why 
he voiced the objection that he did. It is, indeed, a false dogma to think that 
“every intelligible general concept must have known instances”, and I have 
already clarified in the previous chapter that a general concept (one which 
satisfies the generality constraint) is not to be understood as such.23 Strawson is 
not asserting this in his first premise, or in his second one. Rather, the second 
premise is a particular expression of the view that to count as having a certain 
concept, one must in principle be able to identify instances of this concept. And 
the concept of green snow is not a concept of which instances one cannot identify 
in principle. One can identify the colour green, and one can also identify snow – 
the powdery flakes that falls from the sky during winter and is cold to the touch. 
Exercising these two abilities will enable one to identify green snow should it 
exist. The only sense in which it is true to say one cannot identify green snow, in 
this case, is the sense that there is no such thing to be identified. It is not true that 
one cannot in principle identify them. Therefore, the Cartesian cannot use the 
concept of green snow as a relevant counterexample to Strawson’s premise that 
one has the concept of other people only if one can – in principle – identify them.  
 I spent some time examining the concepts of platinum and of green snow 
to emphasize that it is an issue of in-principle identification that is of concern in 
the second premise. Hence, the Cartesian who wishes to dispute this premise, 
properly understood, must show that it is at least plausible for one to count as 
                                                          
22 Kim (1971), op. cit., pp. 339-340, my italics.  
 64
having a certain concept the instances of which one cannot identify, even in 
principle. If there are indeed such counterexamples, then the Cartesian would 
have a foothold against Strawson’s second premise. I will now consider if there 
are any such concepts which pose such a problem of identification. What about 
the concept of an unperceived object? By ‘perception’, I am referring to all types 
of sensory perception, and not just a visual one. Someone who is listening to a 
piece of music, or feeling the texture of a stone while being blindfolded, all count 
as perceiving the particulars concerned. Many things satisfy the concept of an 
unperceived object. For example, the money locked in my safe, and the book in 
my unopened drawer. I seem to have this concept but it may not be as clear that I 
can identify such an object in principle, since, by definition, it falls outside my 
perceptual field. A Cartesian may argue that if one identifies an unperceived 
object, that might disqualify it as an object unperceived, so he thinks it is not 
clear how anyone can ever identify something like that. Would this concept be a 
successful counterexample? If it is indeed true that we have the concept of an 
unperceived object even though we cannot in principle pick one out, then the 
Cartesian may have a case against Strawson’s second premise.  
 I concede that we do have the concept of an unperceived object, but it is 
false that we cannot in principle identify it. We can do so. For example, I only 
need to open my drawer to identify the book that was previously unperceived by 
anybody. I can even place the book on the table, cover it with a cloth and point to 
it (without touching it) as the book that is once again unperceived – we are not 
perceiving the book; we are perceiving only the shape of it and from that inferring 
                                                                                                                                                              
23 ibid, p. 340 
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that it is the same book that we have covered a moment ago.24 Likewise, I can 
place five one-hundred dollar bills under lock and key in an otherwise empty 
opaque safe. It is true that the money is now unperceived by anyone, but clearly I 
can state that the $500 I was previously holding in my hand is now in the safe, so 
I can identify the money that is now unperceived – it is the money I was holding a 
moment ago. It is therefore not true that one cannot in principle identify 
unperceived objects, hence it is little wonder that we have such a concept. 
Contrary to what he may think, the Cartesian cannot use this as a counterexample 
to reject Strawson’s second premise.  
 The next purported counterexample I am going to consider is the concept 
of the only thing in the universe. While it may be relatively straightforward to 
explain how one can identify an unperceived object, it may not be so for this 
concept in question. The Cartesian may argue that for anyone to identify 
something as being the only thing in the universe, that would presuppose that the 
identifier is also present in the universe. In that case, there would be at least two 
things in the universe, and not one. There is then nothing that is the only thing in 
the universe. Hence, the Cartesian maintains, it is not at all clear how one can in 
principle identify any instances of this concept without seemingly violating the 
concept. And yet, it is a concept that we can quite legitimately be said to have. Is 
this then a counterexample to Strawson’s view that one counts as having a certain 
concept only if one can in principle identify instances of this concept?  
                                                          
24 I am circumventing larger issues such as whether we are all deceived by an evil demon about 
our perceptions; or whether there is really a book behind the appearance of it; or if the book still 
exists when it is unperceived. If all these larger issues have to be taken into consideration, then I 
think it will unnecessarily stall our present discussion on Strawson’s argument against 
Cartesianism.  
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 Again, I think not. As before, it is not true that one cannot in principle 
identify instances of this concept. The concept of the only thing in the universe is 
not very much unlike that of being alone in a particular room, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. One can identify oneself as being alone in a particular room, at 
a particular time. And one can identify someone else as being alone in that same 
room at a certain other time. A similar account goes for identifying an instance of 
the concept of the only thing in the universe. Suppose there is a particular, call it 
‘Y’, that is the only thing that exists in the universe since the beginning of time. 
Then, at, say, 3.01pm on Aug 4 2005, one comes into existence and finds that 
apart from oneself, Y is the only other thing in the universe. One then identifies Y 
as having been the only thing in the universe till a minute before. Y satisfies the 
concept of the only thing in the universe up till 3.01pm on Aug 4 2005, and from 
this same time forth one can identify Y as having been an instance of this 
concept. It does not matter that from this time onwards, Y no longer satisfies the 
concept of the only thing in the universe, in which case, there is just no such thing 
for one to identify. But it is not true that one cannot in principle identify an 
instance of such a concept – one just did when one picked out Y as having been 
the only thing in the universe. One can also go out of existence and pop back in at 
a later time and once again identify Y as having been the only thing in the 
universe during one’s absence. Or more simply, it is also possible for Y to 
disappear and one can then identify oneself as the only thing in the universe. 
Though this scenario seems fantastic, it is not theoretically impossible. This 
shows that one can in principle identify instances of the concept of the only thing 
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in the universe. There is no problem of identification here, and it is therefore not a 
counterexample for Strawson.  
 The last concept that I will consider is the concept of an in-principle 
undetectable object. As the expression suggests, this is an object which is in 
principle undetectable by anybody. Suppose the Cartesian uses this to object to 
the view that one has a certain concept only if one can in principle identify its 
instances. The Cartesian alleges that we have such a concept although we are 
unable to identify any instances of it since they are, by definition, undetectable in 
principle. One cannot identify something without at the same time detecting that 
thing. So, it would be a contradiction to identify something as being an in-
principle undetectable object. The Cartesian may then take this to challenge 
Strawson’s view that one can lay claim to a certain concept only if one can in 
principle identify instances of it. Will this objection work?  
In this case, I concede that the Cartesian is right to say we are faced with a 
problem of identification with regards to this concept. I agree that if anything 
satisfies this concept at all, it is in principle impossible for anyone to identify it, 
since that would immediately disqualify that particular as such an instance. 
However, it is far from clear that we have the concept of an in-principle 
unidentifiable object to begin with. It hardly seems to be a genuine concept which 
we can quite indisputably claim to have. It remains very much an open question 
as to how we even make sense of it, and in this case, I think if the Cartesian 
alleges that we have such a concept, then the burden of proof is on him to show 
how this is so. Until the Cartesian can convince us that we can plausibly be said 
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to have this concept, Strawson has every legitimate reason to disregard it as a 
possible counterexample.  
All the alleged counterexamples I have discussed so far fail to challenge 
Strawson’s view that unless one can in principle identify instances of a given 
concept, one cannot be said to possess this concept. Though perhaps not 
transparently true, it is not an easy view to discount.  
If one claims to have a concept the instances of which are theoretically 
unidentifiable, then the natural view to take would be that this concept is just not 
genuine. Likewise, if one cannot in principle identify any other people, then there 
is no reason to suggest that one has this concept at all. The Cartesian has yet to 
raise any decisive objection against it, so the second premise of Strawson’s 
argument still holds.  
 Having said that, there may be a residual worry about this premise, and it 
is this. Suppose the Cartesian grants Strawson that it is necessary for one to be 
able, in principle, to identify instances of a certain concept in order to lay claim to 
it. But he points out that he can identify one individual that satisfies his concept 
of a person – himself. Hence, the Cartesian claims, going by Strawson’s own 
view, he should already count as having the concept of a person – why must the 
Cartesian be able to identify other people too? That is because, as I have 
established in the previous chapter, to have the concept of oneself presupposes 
that one has the concept of other people. That is, if one does not have the concept 
of other people, then the concept of oneself is also empty. If the Cartesian claims 
to be able to identify himself as an instance of his concept of a person, that entails 
that he already has the concept of his own self, which in turn entails that he must 
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also have the concept of other people. It is the concept of other people that is now 
at issue for the Cartesian. And according to Strawson, one would not count as 
having a particular concept unless one can in principle identify instances of it. So, 
it follows that the Cartesian needs to be able to identify other people, at least in 
principle. That he can identify his own self does not count since he is clearly not 
an instance of the concept of other people. And unless he can in principle identify 
other people, he does not have the concept of them, and accordingly, he also does 
not have the concept of his own self.  
 
V) The Epistemological and Conceptual Problems of Other Minds 
We are now in a better position to see how the epistemological problem of 
other minds, and the conceptual one are related. The better known among the two 
is the epistemological problem of other minds which addresses the question of 
whether we have any good reasons to believe that there are other minds. It is 
generally agreed that the problem arises for the Cartesian. The widely accepted 
reasoning is this. Experience, for the Cartesian, is necessarily private. The 
Cartesian concedes that he has direct acquaintance with only his own experience, 
he does not have such direct, intimate acquaintance with others’ experience. And 
he also grants that if so, then there is at least the possibility that others do not 
have the experience that he has. In other words, there is the possibility that others 
are not conscious, in the Cartesian sense of having such private experience, in the 
same way that the Cartesian is. And given that there is such a possibility that 
others are not conscious, then, it is alleged, the Cartesian cannot claim to know 
that they are. Put another way, given such a possibility, the Cartesian does not 
 70
have good reasons to believe that other minds, or other subjects of experience, 
exist.  
Strawson describes this problem for the Cartesian in a different way. I 
mentioned in my introduction that the third premise of Strawson’s argument 
against Cartesianism, if true, describes this epistemological problem for the 
Cartesian. This premise states that if the essence of one’s concept of other people 
is that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify other people. This is 
because, according to Strawson, if one’s concept of other people is esssentially 
that of subjects of experience, then the only way to identify them is to identify the 
experience of which they are subjects. But the Cartesian would concede that one 
cannot identify others’ experience in the sense that one is not directly acquainted 
with them. From this it follows that if one’s concept of other people is essentially 
that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify them. And given that the 
Cartesian’s concept of other people is essentially as such, he is therefore unable to 
identify other people.  
Thus far, this is the familiar sceptical worry about the existence of other 
minds. However, if Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism is sound, then the 
Cartesian is faced with a conceptual problem as well, and it is a conceptual 
problem of minds in general. This is because, according to the second premise, 
one has the concept of other people only if one can (in principle) identify them. I 
have explained above how the Cartesian may be said to have an epistemological 
problem of being unable to identify other people. Some Cartesian sceptics 
concede that this is an in-principle inability. Hence, according to Strawson’s 
argument, such a Cartesian not only fails to have the knowledge about other 
 71
people, but also fails to have the concept of them.25 And lastly, the first premise 
states that one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other 
people. Since the Cartesian does not have the concept of other people, it follows 
that he also does not have the concept of his own self. In other words, if the 
Cartesian accepts that he has an epistemological problem of other minds, then, by 
Strawson’s argument, he is committed to having a conceptual problem of minds, 
in general – he has neither the concept of other minds, nor that of his own.  
The other way of looking at the relation between the epistemological and 
the conceptual problems is this. Clearly the Cartesian would not want to hold that 
he has a conceptual problem of minds. The Cartesian thinks that he has both the 
concepts of his own self and of other people. These two concepts are taken for 
granted in the traditional Cartesian framework. The most that a traditional 
Cartesian is willing to grant is that he does not know that other people exist, but 
he would not doubt that he has the concept of them. However, if Strawson’s 
argument is sound, then there is no room for the Cartesian to concede that he has 
an epistemological problem of other minds either. This is because one has the 
concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. But one has the 
concept of other people only if one can identify them. From these premises, it 
follows that one has the concept of oneself only if one can identify other people. 
That is, if one has the concept of oneself at all, then one can also identify other 
people. Having the concept of oneself already presupposes that one can identify 
other people. Since the Cartesian maintains that he has the concept of his own 
self, then he must accept that he can also identify other people. There is no room 
                                                          
25 In the next chapter, I assess a possible way in which a Cartesian may claim to be able to identify 
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here for him to doubt that he has such an ability without compromising his grasp 
of the concept of his own self. The same goes for his concept of other people. The 
Cartesian claims to have the concept of other people, even if not the knowledge 
that they exist. But this position is untenable for Strawson. Recall that the second 
premise of his argument states that one has the concept of other people only if one 
can identify them. In other words, if one has the concept of other people, then one 
can identify them. Since the Cartesian claims that he has this concept, then it 
follows that he can already identify other people. As before, he cannot doubt that 
he has this ability to establish the existence of other people without jeopardising 
his concept of them to begin with. This is why I claim that the epistemological 
problem of other minds, and the conceptual problem of minds in general, rise and 
fall together. The Cartesian cannot concede that he has the epistemological 
problem without conceding that he has the conceptual one too. Conversely, he 
cannot deny that he has the conceptual problem without also denying that he has 
the epistemological one.26  
 
VI) The Argument from Analogy 
 This brings me to the last section on the argument from analogy, which is 
a well-known response to the epistemological problem of other minds. This is the 
view that one’s belief that other people are conscious is justified based on the 
analogy between others and oneself. One is conscious of one’s own experience. 
But apart from an introspective awareness of one’s experience, one also observes 
                                                                                                                                                              
other people.  
26 See A. Avramides, Other Minds, (NY: Routledge, 2001) for her introduction to the problem of 
other minds. Chapters 7-9 focus specifically on the conceptual problem.  
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that one often displays certain characteristic behavior with certain experience. 
And one notices that other people exhibit like behavior too. For example, when I 
scald my hand, I feel a burning sensation, but I also grimace and quickly 
withdraw my hand and run to the nearest tap. When the same event happens to 
John, I observe that he too makes a scowl and dashes to the tap. Since both John 
and I display like behavior and mine is accompanied by a painful sensation, I 
infer that John also experiences a similar sensation. I justify my belief that John 
feels pain in that situation given that I also feel pain under like circumstances. My 
experience therefore forms the inductive base from which I infer other people’s 
experience, or so the argument goes.  
 There are renowned difficulties with the argument from analogy. One of 
them is its allegedly weak inductive base. One makes the inference about other 
people’s experience based only on the case of oneself. It is from observing only 
our own case that we notice a certain experience goes with a certain behavior. 
And from observing one such case, we infer that other people have the same 
experience when they exhibit similar behavior. Some critics object that since the 
inference is drawn from such a weak inductive base – only the case of oneself – 
the strength of the inference is dubitable. Put another way, if the case of oneself is 
all that one has to go on, then one’s belief that other people are conscious does 
not seem very well-supported.  
 I am not concerned with the above, nor with most of the typically-known 
weaknesses, of the argument from analogy, for a more interesting consequence 
follows from Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, if it is sound. I have 
explained that for Strawson, the epistemological and the conceptual problems rise 
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and fall together. Having the concept of oneself presupposes that one has the 
ability to identify other people, that one knows that other people exist. A 
proponent of the argument from analogy attempts to justify his belief that other 
people are conscious by inferring from his own case: he observes that a certain 
experience of his is associated with a certain behavior and thus infers that other 
people who exhibit like behavior have that experience too. The argument from 
analogy proceeds on the assumption that its proponent has the concept of his own 
self. But Strawson reminds us that if that is so, then it presupposes that the 
proponent already has the ability to identify other people – the very ability that 
the argument from analogy is intended to justify. Therefore, the argument from 
analogy cannot be used as a justification for one’s belief in the existence of other 
people because such a justification would be circular. Unless one already knows 
that other people exist, one would not have the concept of oneself in the first 
place. Strawson explains:  
There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, or at 
all, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of 
consciousness to others. So he cannot argue in general ‘from his own case’ to 
conclusions about how to do this; for unless he already knows how to do this, he 
has no conception of his own case, or any case, i.e. any subject of experiences.27 
 
The interesting consequence of Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, if it is 
sound, is that the argument from analogy must then be excluded from the outset 
as a response to the epistemological problem of other minds.28 It cannot even be 
allowed to get off the ground because it can proceed only by presupposing that 
which it is supposed to justify.  
                                                          
27 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 106 
28 Strawson, of course, does not think there is an epistemological problem to begin with unless one 
is prepared to acknowledge that one has a conceptual problem too.  
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 In this chapter, I devoted a substantial amount of attention to defending 
the second and most controversial premise of Strawson’s argument against 
Cartesianism, namely, the claim that one has the concept of other people only if 
one can identify them. More generally, Strawson is asserting that one counts as 
having a certain concept only if one can (in principle) identify instances of this 
concept. I argued that several counterexamples that purport to challenge this view 
fail to do so because it is not true that one cannot in principle identify the 
instances of those concepts concerned. And for the one case in which it is indeed 
theoretically impossible for anyone to identify its instances – the concept of an in-
principle undetectable object – I questioned that we can even be said to have this 
concept in the first place. This purported counterexample, far from undermining 
Strawson’s view, seems to corroborate his position, in my opinion. And so, even 
though it may not initally be obvious, I maintain it is true that one does not have 
the concept of other people unless one can (in principle) identify them. And since, 
according to the first premise, one has the concept of oneself only if one has the 
concept of other people, it follows that if one has the concept of oneself at all, 
then one can also identify other people. This latter ability is one that cannot be 
doubted without compromising one’s grasp of the concept of oneself. This has 
several implications. One of them is that if one claims to have an epistemological 
problem of other minds, then one is necessarily also faced with a conceptual 
problem of minds in general. And since no one would concede that he does not 
even have the concept of his own self, then one should not doubt one’s ability to 
identify other people either. Strawson’s insight lies in drawing out the 
inextricable link between the epistemological and conceptual problems. The other 
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equally interesting implication of Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, if 
sound, is that the argument from analogy, as a justification for one’s belief in the 
existence of other people, is circular. This is because the argument proceeds on 
the assumption that one already knows that other people exist, that one can 
already identify such people. This ability, this knowledge, cannot be doubted 




Chapter 3: The Third Premise: How to Identify Cartesian Egos? 
 
I) Overview 
I used the last two chapters to establish the claim that one has the concept of 
oneself only if one can (in principle) identify other people. This is a consequence 
of the first two premises of Strawson’s argument. If my arguments are sound, 
then the Cartesian must now show that he can identify other people if he wants to 
retain his concept of his own self. Strawson, of course, maintains that the 
Cartesian cannot identify other people, even in principle. This is because, as the 
third premise states, one cannot identify other people if one’s concept of them is 
essentially that of subjects of experience. We know that the Cartesian’s essential 
concept of a person is indeed that of a subject of experience, or a pure ego. 
Descartes maintains that it is possible for him to conceive of himself existing 
without his body, but not possible for him to conceive of himself existing without 
his mind. Therefore, his essence must lie in his thinking mind. Descartes writes, 
“My essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing.”1 In other 
words, his essential concept of himself, and that of a person in general, is that of a 
pure ego. Given that this is the central tenet of traditional Cartesianism, no one 
who wishes to defend the position would want to challenge Descartes’ claim. 
Hence, Strawson also takes this view for granted throughout his argument against 
Cartesianism. He argues that since the essence of the Cartesian’s concept of a 
person is that of a subject of experience, and, according to the third premise, one 
                                                          
1 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, tr. John Cottingham, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 54, my italics. 
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cannot identify other people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects 
of experience, it then follows that the Cartesian cannot identify others. Given that 
one has the concept of oneself only if one can identify other people – a result of 
the first two premises of Strawson’s argument – the Cartesian, in failing to 
identify others, loses the concept of his own self. The focus of this chapter lies in 
the third premise of Strawson’s argument. I will explain how I think Strawson 
would support this claim. As mentioned in my introduction, Strawson offers no 
explicit argument for it in his work, but it would not be too difficult to discern it 
from his writings. I will also clarify why I have rephrased this premise from its 
original statement, viz., one cannot identify other people if one can identify them 
only as subjects of experience. And lastly, I will examine some potential 
Cartesian objections to the third premise. In particular, I will assess the objections 
that C. T. Kim and M. C. Bradley raise against it.2 I argue that Strawson has an 
effective reply to them and so the third premise, like the first two, also holds.  
 
II) Argument for the Third Premise 
 In ‘Persons’, Strawson raises the question “How is it that one can ascribe 
[states of consciousness] to others?”3 In other words, he is asking how one comes 
to have the concept of other people.  And to this he says:  
Now one thing is certain: that if the things one ascribes states of consciousness 
to, in ascribing them to others, are thought of as a set of Cartesian egos to which 
only private experiences can, in correct logical grammar, be ascribed, then this 
question is unanswerable and this problem insoluble.4  
 
                                                          
2 Both Kim and Bradley do not themselves endorse traditional Cartesianism. Kim, in particular, 
has his own objection against it, which he also discusses in his article. But they do think that 
Strawson’s argument, as it stands, is not decisive against Cartesianism.  
3 P. F. Strawson, ‘Persons’, Individuals, (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 100  
4 Ibid, p. 100 
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Put loosely, Strawson is asserting that if one conceives of other people only as a 
set of Cartesian egos, then the question of how one comes to have the concept of 
them would be “unanswerable”. That is, it is not clear to Strawson how anyone 
who claims to be able to conceive of other people as such would have the concept 
of other people to begin with. That is because: 
If, in identifying the things to which states of consciousness are to be ascribed, 
private experiences are to be all one has to go on, then, just for the very same 
reason as that for which there is, from one’s own point of view, no question of 
telling that a private experience is one’s own, there is also no question of telling 
that a private experience is another’s. All private experiences, all states of 
consciousness, will be mine. . .5  
 
The third premise of Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism, and his support 
for it, can be drawn from the above quote. In his own words, the premise is this: 
“one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of 
experience, possessors of states of consciousness”.6 Put simply, he is saying that 
if the only way one has to identify other people is to identify them as subjects of 
experience, then one would not be able to identify them at all. This view is 
supported by two suppressed assumptions which Strawson does not explicitly 
state. The first, which I shall call ‘assumption A’, is that if one can identify other 
people only as subjects of experience, then one can identify such people only by 
identifying their experiences. To illustrate, suppose the only way you can identify 
Peter Strawson is to identify him as the father of Galen Strawson. Then, the only 
way you can pick out Peter Strawson is to pick out his son, Galen Strawson. If 
there is any other way by which you can identify Peter Strawson, say, if you can 
identify him as the author of Individuals, then it is presumably no longer true that 
you can identify Peter Strawson only as the father of Galen Strawson. You can 
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also identify him as the author of Individuals. Hence, Strawson would agree that 
if anyone claims he can identify Peter Strawson only as the father of Galen 
Strawson, then there must be no other way by which he can identify Peter 
Strawson, on pain of contradiction. Similarly, if one claims to be able to identify 
other people only as subjects of experience, then he can identify them only by 
identifying their experiences.  
The second implicit assumption, which I shall call ‘assumption B’, is if 
one can identify other people only as subjects of experience, then one cannot 
identify the experiences of other people. Construed in a typically Cartesian way 
of thinking, the traditional Cartesian will concede that he cannot identify the 
experiences of other people in that he is not directly acquainted with other 
people’s experiences. Strawson captures the characteristic Cartesian thinking 
when he writes: “for the very same reason as that for which there is, from one’s 
own point of view, no question of telling that a private experience is one’s own, 
there is also no question of telling that a private experience is another’s.”7 From 
the Cartesian’s point of view, it is impossible that his private experience is not 
his, on pain of contradiction, and so it is equally impossible that this same private 
experience, or any private experiences that he knows of for that matter, can be 
somebody else’s. The Cartesian would grant assumption B that if one can identify 
others only as subjects of experience, then one cannot directly identify the 
experiences of others, since experiences are private in the Cartesian framework. 
And yet, according to assumption A, if one can identify other people only as 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Ibid, p. 100 
6 Ibid, p. 100 
7 Ibid, p. 100 
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subjects of experience, then one can identify them only by identifying their 
experience. Since the Cartesian concedes that he cannot directly identify their 
experience, then, according to Strawson, it follows that one would not be able to 
identify other people if one can identify them only as subjects of experience – as 
the third premise of Strawson’s main argument states. 
 At this point, I want to clarify what Strawson means by the phrase ‘one 
can identify other people only as subjects of experience’, as it appears throughout 
his implicit argument for his third premise. In what sense is it true to say that the 
Cartesian can identify others only as subjects of experience? There is surely one 
sense in which this is false – the sense that he can, and in fact does, identify them 
as also having a physical body, being in a certain spatial location, having 
particular likes and dislikes, being named so-and-so etc. There are many other 
things that also enter into the Cartesian’s concept of a person and on this reading, 
it is false that the Cartesian can identify other people only as subjects of 
experience – the Cartesian can also identify other people as many other things. 
However, such considerations are irrelevant to Strawson because his critical focus 
is on the essential Cartesian concept of a person as a pure ego. He wants to reject 
Descartes’ claim that “my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking 
thing.”8 It is in this second sense that the Cartesian would claim one can identify 
other people only as subjects of experience – the sense that essentially, the 
concept of a person is that of an ego and it is possible to conceive of a person 
existing without his body. Therefore, it is also this sense that Strawson wants to 
deny. It does not matter that many other things are also part of the Cartesian’s 
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concept of a person, such as having a body, having a name etc. These do not form 
the essence of a Cartesian person and thus do not bother Strawson. His aim is to 
show that if the essence of one’s concept of other people is that of subjects of 
experience, then one cannot identify them. I rephrased the third premise like so to 
highlight this.   
 In this sharpened light, the implicit argument for it is also modified 
accordingly. Assumption A now is if the essence of one’s concept of other people 
is that of subjects of experience, then one can identify them only by identifying 
the experiences of which they are subjects. If there is any other way of identifying 
other people, then it would presumably be false that one’s concept of them is 
essentially that of subjects of experience. And assumption B states that if the 
essence of one’s concept of other people is that of subjects of experience, then 
one cannot identify their experience. Therefore, if the essence of one’s concept of 
other people is that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify other 
people.9  
 
III) A Possible Cartesian Defense?  
 A natural response to Strawson’s third premise is that even if one’s 
concept of other people is essentially that of subjects of experience, it is not 
obvious that one then has no other way of identifying other people apart from 
identifying their experiences. Put differently, even if one does have some other 
way of identifying other people, it does not immediately follow that one’s concept 
of them is not essentially that of subjects of experience. It seems at least possible, 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 Renes Descartes (1996), op. cit, p. 54 
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the Cartesian claims, for one’s essential concept of a person to remain a certain 
way and yet identify such people by other means that do not violate one’s 
essential concept. C. T. Kim considers just such a way in which a Cartesian can 
presumably identify other minds while retaining his essential concept of a person. 
He thinks “a Cartesian mind can identifyingly refer to another Cartesian mind via 
the reference to the body with which it is causally related”.10 Kim reminds us that 
the Cartesian framework allows for pure egos to be contingently related to 
physical bodies. The Cartesian does not deny that the physical condition of one’s 
body has a causal effect on one’s experiences. For example, if one closes one’s 
eyes, one sees nothing. Or, if one takes drugs or alcohol, it will alter the 
biochemical makeup of one’s body thereby impairing one’s vision. These are 
phenomena that the Cartesian accepts. Since he grants that one’s body is causally 
related to one’s mind, Kim thinks the Cartesian can then indirectly identify other 
people by identifying the bodies to which their minds are so related. But as this 
relation is contingent, it remains consistent with the view that the essence of a 
person lies in the thinking mind. In other words, we can take Kim to be objecting 
to assumption A that if one’s concept of other people is essentially that of 
subjects of experience, then one can identify them only by identifying their 
experiences. Kim retorts that even if the Cartesian’s essential concept of a person 
is as such, he still has an indirect way to identify other people – via reference to 
their bodies – so it is not true that he necessarily has to identify their experiences. 
And since identifying bodies is no more problematic than identifying other 
                                                                                                                                                              
9 Henceforth, any reference to assumptions A and B is to this modified version.  
10 C. T. Kim, ‘Cartesian Dualism and The Unity of a Mind’, in Mind, New Series, Vol. 80, No. 
319, (Jul 1971), , p. 342 
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physical objects like tables and chairs, it should also be equally straightforward 
for the Cartesian to identify other Cartesian egos through this indirect means. For 
instance, John would be the ego that is contingently related to that body (pointing 
to John’s) just as I am contingently related to this body (pointing to my own). The 
Cartesian maintains that even if he identifies John indirectly through the body to 
which he is attached, his concept of John is still essentially that of a pure ego. 
Therefore, according to this line of defence, it is possible to identify other people 
without identifying their experiences while preserving one’s essential concept of 
them. Given that the Cartesian rejects assumption A, he accordingly denies the 
third premise of Strawson’s main argument that one cannot identify other people 
if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects of experience.  
 A query may arise at this point. If it is granted that one can identify other 
minds indirectly by identifying the bodies to which they are causally related, then 
there is also a sense in which one can identify particular experiences of others – 
by identifying the particular states of particular bodies to which they are so 
linked. That is, it would seem that assumption B, namely, if one’s concept of 
other people is essentially that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify 
the experiences of others, is also false in one sense. While the Cartesian concedes 
that he cannot directly identify the experiences of others, he may claim that he 
can do so indirectly – in the way considered above. Kim, in his article, also talks 
about identifying particular experiences in this indirect way.  
In answer to Strawson’s charge that no Cartesian mind can identifyingly refer to 
another Cartesian mind, the Cartesian theorist may hold that a Cartesian mind, 
M1, can refer to another Cartesian mind, M2, as the Cartesian mind whose 
experience, E, causes (or is caused by) the state, S, of the body, B.11  
                                                          
11 Ibid, p. 341, my italics. 
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This is another interpretation we can make of Kim’s defence of Cartesianism. He 
may grant Strawson assumption A that if one’s concept of other people is 
essentially that of subjects of experience, then one can identify them only by 
identifying the experiences of which they are subjects. But, as above, he may 
suggest that the Cartesian can identify a particular experience by identifying the 
state of a certain body with which the experience is causally related. That is, Kim 
may object to assumption B that if one’s essential concept of others is that of 
subjects of experience, then one cannot identify their experiences. He may think 
one can do so indirectly. Hence, again, it does not follow that if one’s concept of 
other people is essentially that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify 
them.  
 Kim then goes on to anticipate some possible Strawsonian objections to 
this defence and argues that they are not decisive against the Cartesian. The first 
such objection is the worry that the uniqueness of the body does not guarantee the 
uniqueness of the ego.12 Kim represents the objection as follows:  
One objection of Strawson to the view that a Cartesian mind can identifyingly 
refer to another Cartesian mind via the reference to the body with which it is 
causally related is that there is no guarantee that one and only one Cartesian 
mind is causally related with one animate human body, so that the definite 
description “the Cartesian mind causally related with the body, B” may not be 
justifiably applied.13  
 
This worry applies whether the Cartesian is trying to identify other minds or their 
particular experiences. Since the relation between a body and an ego is a 
contingent one, there is no logical contradiction in supposing that more than one 
                                                          
12 This is also an argument that Strawson advances against Cartesianism. However, it lies outside 
the focus of my thesis so my discussion of it here is not intended to be in-depth. See chapter 4 of 
Individuals for this.  
13 Kim (1971), op. cit., p. 342 
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subject of experience is attached to a particular body. Likewise, in the Cartesian 
framework, the relation between a particular experience and a particular physical 
state of the body is contingent. And if so, then there is also no logical guarantee 
that one and only one particular state of consciousness is associated with a 
particular state of a body. There may be a set of qualitatively indistinguishable 
experiences causally related to a particular physical state. For example, a given 
physical state, B, may be causally related to three particular states of pain, P1, P2, 
and P3, belonging to three different egos. So, one has not uniquely picked out any 
pain state simply by identifying B. A more fantastic scenario is also possible. 
Kim describes a case in which 
the physical event of a bare foot of a live human body stepping on a nail may 
cause a pain sensation belonging to M1, a feeling of joy belonging to another 
mind M2, and a thought of God belonging to a third mind M3.14  
 
As before, it may well be that reference to a particular state of a particular body 
picks out, instead, a set of particular experiences causally related to it. So, “the 
identifying phrase ‘the Cartesian mind which has the experience causally related 
with the state, S, of a body, B’ cannot be justifiably applied.”15 Therefore, a 
Strawsonian may question the Cartesian’s purported ability to identify other 
minds or their experiences in this way.  
 However, Kim thinks the Cartesian is not “defenceless against these 
objections”.16 He may hold as a postulate of his theory that there is one and only 
one Cartesian mind causally related to a particular body. This postulate will 
respect the contingency of the relation between a particular Cartesian mind and a 
                                                          
14 Ibid, p. 342 
15 Ibid, p. 342 
 
16 Ibid, p. 343 
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particular body. The Cartesian may hold that a certain body B1 is uniquely related 
to a certain mind M1, but grant that it is logically possible for M1 to be related to 
B2 instead. Kim thinks the Cartesian can consistently maintain that there is a 
unique match between a particular mind and a particular body even if such a 
match is contingent. Similarly, Kim argues that the Cartesian can consistently 
postulate that there is a unique match between a particular experience and a 
particular physical state of a particular body.  
There is of course no inconsistency in assuming, on the part of the Cartesian 
theorist, that given a particular state of a particular body, there is one and only 
one Cartesian mind whose experiences are causally related with states of that 
body. . . This postulate, if it is so to be regarded, is consistent with the other 
thesis of Cartesian dualism that relations between states of a Cartesian mind 
(namely, experiences) and states of a body are logically contingent.17  
 
If this postulate is accepted, the Cartesian’s answer to the Strawsonian objection 
will be that it is a postulate of his theory that picking out a particular body will 
successfully pick out one and only one particular mind.   
 Naturally, Kim recognises that an intuitive Strawsonian response to this 
Cartesian reply is that it is completely ad hoc. Kim concedes that such a postulate 
may seem arbitrary, but he thinks it is unclear on what grounds the charge of 
arbitrariness arises. He first considers the case where it is regarded as arbitrary 
because of insufficient empirical support, and he thinks that this problem is not 
unique to Cartesianism.  
This charge of arbitrariness could be taken to mean that there is no sufficient 
empirical evidence for the postulate, that this postulate cannot be defended on 
empirical grounds alone. When the charge of arbitrariness is thus construed, it is 
no longer peculiarly applicable to Cartesian dualism. It is generally agreed that 
rivals of Cartesian dualism like parallelism and the identity theory cannot be 
defended on empirical grounds alone either.18 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid, p. 343 
18 Ibid, p. 343 
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Take the position of parallelism which, broadly construed, states that all 
experiences have physical correlates. For example, a particular pain state, on this 
theory, is correlated with, even if not caused by, a particular physical state of a 
particular body. Kim thinks that even if observations of physical-mental 
correlation strongly motivates such a thesis, it “cannot possibly be defended 
exclusively” on these empirical grounds.19 The same goes for the identity theory. 
“Nor can the thesis of the identity theory that there are no experiences which are 
not identical (in some intelligible sense or other) with brain states be defended 
exclusively on empirical grounds.”20 Hence, Kim retorts that if the complaint of 
arbitrariness stems from insufficient empirical grounds alone, then the Cartesian 
position is no more disadvantaged than rival theories. Furthermore, Kim points 
out that there are empirical considerations that the Cartesian can adduce to in 
support of his postulate. He claims:  
The fact that when a Cartesian mind has an experience causally related with a 
state of the body which it calls its own, it has no knowledge of any other 
experience causally related with that physical state is surely relevant, though not 
at all sufficient . . .21  
 
Therefore, the postulate in question is not completely unwarranted in Kim’s 
opinion. Kim then goes on to consider the case where a Strawsonian objects to 
the postulate because there are no grounds, empirical or otherwise, for it. And 
Kim’s reply to this is simply that the Strawsonian has yet to make clear the 
considerations he has in mind.  
If Strawson is alluding to some metatheoretical considerations which show the 
inadvisability of adopting Cartesian dualism, he does not explicitly state them. 22 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid, p. 343 
20 Ibid, p. 343 
21 Ibid, p. 343 
22 Ibid, p. 344 
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On these grounds, Kim thinks that the Strawsonian has no decisive objections 
against the Cartesian postulate that particular Cartesian minds/experiences are 
uniquely related to bodies/physical states of the bodies.  
 To recapitulate, Kim thinks a Cartesian can posit that there is a unique 
match between Cartesian egos and their bodies in response to the worry that he 
cannot uniquely pick out a Cartesian ego via reference to a particular body. Such 
a postulate is consistent with the central Cartesian view that the relationship 
between any Cartesian mind and any physical body is contingent. And even 
though it may initially seem arbitrary, Kim thinks the Strawsonian has not 
explicitly stated any considerations that are decisive against it. With this worry 
out of the way, Kim considers no further Strawsonian objections to the proposed 
method of identifying other people. Contrary to what Strawson’s third premise 
states, Kim thinks one can identify other people, indirectly, even if one’s concept 
of them is essentially that of subjects of experience. As mentioned, one way to 
understand Kim’s defence is to take him to object to assumption A that if one’s 
concept of other people is essentially that of subjects of experience, then one can 
identify them only by identifying their experiences. Kim has suggested another 
way of identifying others, viz., through their bodies to which the minds are 
related. Alternatively, we can understand Kim as disputing assumption B instead, 
namely, the assertion that if one’s concept of others is essentially that of subjects 
of experience, then one cannot identify their experiences. Kim thinks one can do 
so indirectly – by identifying the individual physical states of the bodies to which 
the particular experiences are contingently linked. If this is viable, then the 
Cartesian can well grant assumption A and accept that he necessarily has to 
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identify other minds by identifying their experiences, but in which case it is then 
false that he cannot do so. In whichever way we interpret Kim’s defence, he is 
denying one of the two implicit assumptions supporting the third premise of 
Strawson’s main argument. If his defence is sound, it would allow him to reject 
the view that one cannot identify other people if one’s concept of them is 
essentially that of subjects of experience.  
 
IV) Strawson’s Reply 
 As mentioned earlier, Kim asserts that Strawson does not give any 
metatheoretical considerations, if he has any, for rejecting the indirect method of 
identifying other people. This is wrong because Strawson has in fact anticipated 
this Cartesian retort. He writes:  
It might be objected that this way with Cartesianism is too short. After all, there 
is no difficulty in distinguishing bodies from one another, no difficulty in 
identifying bodies. Does not this give us an indirect way of identifying subjects 
of experience, while preserving the Cartesian mode? Can we not identify such a 
subject as, for example, ‘the subject that stands to that body in the same special 
relation as I stand to this one’. . . 23 
 
However, Strawson points out that this Cartesian objection begs the question 
against him. The Cartesian who is objecting like so is thinking something like 
this. He notices that his mind is related to his body. Or, to put it in terms of 
experiences, he observes that whenever his body is in a certain physical state, he 
experiences a particular sensation. And when his body is in a certain other 
physical state, he has another particular experience. Some kind of relation seems 
to obtain between particular experiences and particular physical states of the 
bodies. So, even though he concedes that he cannot directly identify other minds, 
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or their experiences, he thinks he can do so indirectly by identifying the bodies, or 
particular states of the bodies, that these minds/experiences are related to. For 
example, the Cartesian would assert that ‘John’s pain is the experience that is 
related to a certain physical state of that body, just as my pain is the experience 
that is related to a certain physical state of this body’. Bodies, the Cartesian 
maintains, are an indirect means by which to identify others. So, on this reading, 
it is not true that the Cartesian cannot identify other people, even if his essential 
concept of them is that of subjects of experience. However, the problem with this 
objection is the Cartesian is taking for granted the concept of his own self. He is 
presupposing that he has the concept of the ‘I’, the first-person, or the concept of 
my pain, when these are the very concepts that are currently in contention. 
Strawson is trying to show with his three-premise argument that the Cartesian 
does not have the concept of his own self. Clearly, the Cartesian wants to resist 
this charge, and he does so by challenging the third premise of Strawson’s 
argument. At this point of the debate, it is supposed to remain an open question 
whether or not the Cartesian has the concept of his own self. But, in his suggested 
account of how to identify others, the Cartesian is already appealing to it – the 
very concept the possession of which he is supposed to justify and as yet 
unentitled to. So, he cannot take the concept of his own self for granted in his 
objection to Strawson’s third premise without begging the question against 
Strawson. This is what Strawson says of the Cartesian’s objection concerned:   
[This] suggestion is useless. It requires me to have noted that my experiences 
stand in a special relation to body M, when it is just the right to speak of my 
experiences at all that is in question. That is to say, it requires me to have noted 
that my experiences stand in a special relation to body M; but it requires me to 
                                                                                                                                                              
23 Strawson (1959), op. cit., pp. 100-101 
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have noted this as a condition of being able to identify other subjects of 
experiences, i.e. as a condition of my having the idea of myself as a subject of 
experience, i.e as a condition of thinking of any experiences as mine.24 
 
This circularity charge should not come as a surprise. I have already 
explained in the previous chapter that the third premise of Strawson’s argument 
against Cartesianism, if true, is an expression of the epistemological problem of 
other minds. The third premise states that if one’s concept of other people is 
essentially that of subjects of experience, then one cannot identify them. This is 
because if one’s concept of other people is essentially that of subjects of 
experience, then the only way to identify them is to identify the experiences of 
which they are subjects. (Assumption A) But, if one’s concept of other people is 
essentially as such, then one cannot identify their experiences. (Assumption B) 
Therefore, it follows that if one’s concept of other people is essentially that of 
subjects of experience, then one cannot identify them. The Cartesian who objects 
to this third premise is also denying that he has an epistemological problem of 
other minds. He wants to show that he can identify other minds, or their 
experiences, in the indirect way that he has suggested. But this indirect method is 
simply an argument from analogy. The Cartesian uses bodies as an indirect means 
of identifying minds because he assumes that some sort of mental-physical 
relation obtains between the minds and bodies of others. And he arrives at this 
assumption only because he observes from his own case a similar relation. 
However, as I have pointed out, the argument from analogy cannot be used to 
justify one’s belief in the existence of others because the justification would be 
circular. In order for the argument from analogy to proceed, the concept of 
                                                          
24 Ibid, p. 101 
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oneself must be taken for granted since it is making an inference about another by 
drawing an analogy with oneself. However, one has the concept of oneself only if 
one can identify other people. This is a consequence of the first and second 
premises of Strawson’s argument. If one has the concept of oneself at all, then 
one can also identify other people. The proponent of the argument from analogy 
presupposes that he has the concept of his own self. Then so too is he 
presupposing that he can identify other people – the very ability the possession of 
which he is supposed to justify. Hence, the argument from analogy, as 
justification of one’s belief in the existence of other minds, is circular. This is the 
same circularity that is at work when the Cartesian is trying to show, pace 
Strawson, that he has the concept of his own self. Essentially, he is trying to deny 
that he has a conceptual problem of minds, in general, by denying that he has an 
epistemological problem of other minds.25 Unfortunately, his response to the 
epistemological problem – the argument from analogy – presupposes both the 
concept of oneself, and the ability to identify others. In light of this circularity, 
the worry with which Kim is originally concerned – the issue of whether the 
uniqueness of bodies guarantees the uniqueness of egos – becomes secondary. 
Strawson can grant that there is a one-to-one match between subjects of 
experience and physical bodies.26 But even if so, the Cartesian cannot appeal to 
bodies as an indirect means to identify others. The Cartesian who does so is 
                                                          
25 At this point where the Cartesian is attacking the third premise of Strawson’s argument, we can 
take him to have granted Strawson his first two premises. In other words, the Cartesian is 
accepting that if one concedes to having an epistemological problem, then he is also conceding to 
having a conceptual one.  
26 Strawson himself thinks that uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the 
Cartesian soul. This is another problem he sees in Cartesianism. See Individuals chapter 4 for this.  
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taking for granted the concept of his own self – a concept that he is not yet 
entitled to have.  
 In the article, ‘Mr. Strawson and Skepticism’, M. C. Bradley suggests 
another way of identifying other people that he thinks escapes the charge of 
circularity. He points out that even though the Cartesian cannot talk about his 
own experience on pain of circularity, it is not  
the end of the story . . . For clearly the right to speak of my and his body are not 
in question and can be regarded as granted. And someone might move from this 
to saying that these experiences (the experiences he knows about, or, as Strawson 
puts it, “all experience” – so far) I shall call ‘mine’, hypothesizing that other 
bodies have qualitatively similar ones uniquely related to them as these are to 
mine. That is, someone might succeed in introducing the distinction between his 
own experience and that of others by reference to the existing distinction 
between his own body and that of others.27  
 
Bradley’s response is superior to that of Kim’s in that he at least recognises the 
circularity inherent in the latter’s. He also recognises, which Kim does not, that 
Strawson has already anticipated, and addressed, the original Cartesian objection, 
namely, the Cartesian view that he can identify others indirectly by their bodies. 
However, the superiority of Bradley’s response notwithstanding, I maintain that it 
still fails to defend Cartesianism against Strawson.  
The first jarring problem with Bradley’s response is he does not explain 
why he thinks it obvious that “the right to speak of my and his body are not in 
question and can be regarded as granted.”28 It is not obvious. In fact, taken 
literally, Strawson would reject the claim. Since the concept of one’s own self is 
in question, Strawson would disallow all use of the first-person pronoun and 
possessives in a Cartesian defence. Whether one talks about my experience, or my 
body, it involves the concept that is in contention. So, without further explanation 
                                                          
27 M. C. Bradley, ‘Mr. Strawson and Skepticism’, in Analysis, Vol. 20 (1959-1960), p. 15.  
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from Bradley, Strawson has the right to reject this initial claim, on the grounds of 
circularity, as before. However, I think Bradley’s objection may be beefed up as 
follows. He may hold that by ‘my body’, he means nothing more than ‘this body’ 
which can be picked out by descriptions that do not presuppose the concept of my 
own self. For example, ‘this body’ may be ‘the body that is standing on a 
particular spot at a particular time’, and ‘that body’ may be ‘the body that is 
dressed in a certain way and has a certain tattoo on a certain part of it’. Strawson 
would not object to talking about this and that body, and we may grant that there 
are certain descriptions that are uniquely true of the bodies in question so one will 
be able to identify them quite unproblematically. Bradley may then argue that 
since the right to speak of this and that body is not in question, one may be able 
to identify another’s experiences as the experiences which are related to that body 
as these experiences are related to this body. Hence, he would object to 
assumption B that if one’s concept of other people is essentially that of subjects 
of experience, then one cannot identify the experiences of others. He maintains 
that one can do so indirectly, in the way he has suggested. And if so, then one can 
identify other people without violating one’s essential concept of them. 
According to Bradley, Strawson’s third premise that one cannot do so if one’s 
concept of other people is essentially that of subjects of experience, is false.  
 I think Bradley’s response, even when modified, also fails. Bradley thinks 
otherwise because this modified account involves only the concepts of this body, 
that body, and these experiences, all of which he assumes are unproblematic. I 
concede that Strawson will permit talk about this and that body. However, he will 
                                                                                                                                                              
28 Ibid, p. 15. This is also found in the passage quoted in the main text.  
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object to Bradley’s use of the term ‘these experiences’. There are two senses to 
this expression. In one sense, ‘these experiences’ just means ‘all experiences’, in 
which case the word ‘these’, as it occurs in the expression, is really redundant. On 
this reading, ‘these experiences’ just is experiences, in general, where no 
juxtaposition whatsoever can be made within this totality of experience. Strawson 
does not object to this sense of the expression. In fact, he thinks this is all a 
Cartesian is left with if he holds on to his position. He writes:  
So long as we persist in talking, in the mode of this explanation, of experiences 
on the one hand, and bodies on the other, the most I may be allowed to have 
noted is that experiences, all experiences, stand in a special relation to body M, 
that body M is unique in just this way, that this is what makes body M unique 
among bodies. 29 
 
Strawson thinks there is no room to distinguish between a certain set of 
experiences, say, these experiences, and another set, say, those experiences, if one 
holds on to the Cartesian model. But Bradley’s use of the term in question seems 
to intend just such a contrast.  He explains the term ‘these experiences’ as “the 
experiences he knows about, or, as Strawson puts it, ‘all experience’ – so far”. 30 
This suggests that he is leaving open the possibility of there being another set of 
experiences which he does not yet know about, and of which he hypothesizes 
may be related to another body as ‘these experiences’ are related to ‘this body’. 
But this is a sense which Strawson would not allow. If what Strawson means by  
‘these experiences’ just is ‘all experiences’, then there is no room to distinguish 
between a certain set of experiences and another possible set. No other set of 
experiences is possible. There are just experiences, period. In implying a contrast 
between these experiences that he knows about and those others that he does not 
                                                          
29 Strawson (1959), op. cit., p. 101 
30 Bradley (1959), op. cit., p. 15, my italics. 
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yet know, Bradley is already appealing to the same distinction that exists between 
‘my experiences’ and ‘others’ experiences’ (or ‘experiences that are not mine’), 
only in different, and perhaps subtler, terms. And Strawson thinks the Cartesian 
cannot presuppose this distinction. Since it is implied in Bradley’s defence, it 
remains vulnerable to Strawson’s circularity objection. Bradley’s account of how 
a Cartesian is to identify other egos also begs the question against Strawson, 
albeit more subtly.  
 As it can be seen, the identification of other egos remains a problem for 
the Cartesian. He certainly cannot directly identify other minds or their 
experiences on pain of contradiction. And, as I have argued, his attempt to do so 
indirectly via reference to bodies also fails because it proceeds by taking for 
granted the distinction between different sets of experience, be it the distinction of 
my experience-your experience, or that of these experience-those experience. It is 
this distinction that is at issue here, so the Cartesian cannot presuppose it in his 
defence on pain of circularity. As it stands, the Cartesian has refuted neither of 
assumptions A and B that supports the third premise of Strawson’s main 
argument. So, I maintain that Strawson’s assertion that one cannot identify other 
people if one’s concept of them is essentially that of subjects of experience, is 
true. Since the Cartesian’s concept of other people is essentially as such, it 
follows that the Cartesian cannot identify other people. And given that to have the 
concept of oneself at all, one must be able to identify other people, the Cartesian, 
in failing to identify others, loses not only the concept of other people, but also 




Conclusion: What, If Not Cartesian Egos? 
 
The chapter ‘Persons’ of Individuals, is part of a larger inquiry into our 
conceptual scheme. In this chapter, Strawson seeks to explain, among other 
things, “the use that we make of the word ‘I’, or how any word has the use that 
word has”.1 More generally, Strawson is trying to examine what constitutes our 
concept of a person. He frames his inquiry with these two questions: 1) Why are 
one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all; and 2) Why are they 
ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain 
physical situation, &c.?2 Strawson thinks the answers to these questions are not 
independent of one another.3 The traditional Cartesian, on the other hand, would 
hold that the second question does not arise, for “it is only a linguistic illusion 
that both kinds of predicates are properly ascribed to one and the same thing”.4 
According to traditional Cartesianism, a person is a compound entity made up of 
two distinct types of substances: a physical body, and a non-physical mind/ego. 
Predicates ascribing physical properties are properly ascribable only to the 
physical body, and predicates ascribing states of consciousness are properly 
ascribable only to the pure ego. The concept of the pure ego/subject of experience 
is also what is essential to the Cartesian concept of a person. That is because, the 
Cartesian claims, it is possible to conceive of a person existing without his body, 
but not without his mind. So, it must be his mind that holds his essence. Put in 
                                                          
1 P. F. Strawson, ‘Persons’, Individuals, (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 94 
2 See ibid, pp. 89-90 
3 I will reveal Strawson’s answer to these questions later.  
4 Ibid, p. 94 
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another way, it is the concept of the mind/pure ego, and not that of a person, that 
is primitive. The derivative concept of a person is to be analysed in terms of the 
primary concept of a pure ego. In other words, the latter concept is logically prior 
to the concept of a person.  
 Strawson rejects this Cartesian concept of a person because it leads to 
serious problems. One of them is the epistemological problem of other minds, as 
described by the third premise of Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism. It 
states that one cannot identify other people if one’s concept of them is essentially 
that of subjects of experience. Given that the Cartesian’s essential concept of a 
person is indeed as such, it follows that the Cartesian is unable to identify other 
people. But that is not all. Strawson argues that the Cartesian faces a conceptual 
problem too. The second premise of Strawson’s argument states that one does not 
have the concept of other people unless one can identify them. Since the 
Cartesian cannot identify others, he also fails to have the concept of other people. 
This situation is sticky enough for Cartesianism because a traditional Cartesian 
takes the concept of other people for granted. However, if the second premise is 
true – and I argued that it is – then he is not even entitled to the concept of other 
people. But to make matters worse, Strawson points out, in the first premise, that 
one has the concept of oneself only if one has the concept of other people. From 
this, it follows that the Cartesian has neither the concept of other people, nor that 
of his own self. The concept of the first-person is one that is taken for granted in 
our conceptual framework. Statements such as the following abound in our 
ordinary discourse: ‘I am so-and-so’, ‘I come from such-and-such a place’, ‘I am 
of a particular age’, ‘I have a certain job’. It is a basic assumption of our ordinary 
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discourse that statements such as the above are not incoherent. However, if 
Strawson’s argument is sound, then those statements would precisely be so for 
the Cartesian since he would not have the concept of his own self. Surely that 
must be a fantastic conclusion to hold? If we retain Cartesianism only to lose the 
concept of the first-person, then I think we are better off without it in the first 
place. Strawson writes:  
it becomes impossible to see how we could come by the idea of different, 
distinguishable, identifiable subjects of experiences – different consciousnesses – 
if this idea is thought of as logically primitive, as a logical ingredient in the 
compound-idea of a person, the latter being composed of two subjects. For there 
could never be any question of assigning an experience, as such, to any subject 
other than oneself; and therefore never any question of assigning it to oneself 
either, never any question of assigning it to a subject at all. 5 
 
 
                                                          
In place of the Cartesian account, Strawson puts forth his alternative 
concept of a person:  
What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such 
that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing 
corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a 
single individual of that single type.6 
 
This is contrary to the Cartesian view that predicates ascribing physical properties 
are properly ascribable only to the physical body, and predicates ascribing states 
of consciousness are properly ascribable only to the pure ego. Rather, both types 
of predicates are properly ascribable to persons, in the Strawsonian sense. Unlike 
the Cartesian’s view, Strawson’s concept of a person is a primitive one. It is 
logically prior to the concept of a subject of experience. He emphasises, “We are 
not . . . to think of [a person] as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two 
primary kinds, viz. a particular consciousness and a particular human body”. 7 
5 Ibid, p. 102 
6 Ibid, pp. 101-102 
7 Ibid, pp. 104-105 
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Instead, the concept of a pure ego has to be analysed in terms of the concept of a 
Strawsonian person to which this ego belongs. One has the concept of an ego 
only if one conceives it as the ego of a particular person. Unless one already has 
the concept of a person, one would not have the concept of an ego at all. To 
Strawson, the Cartesian view of regarding the concept of a pure ego as logically 
prior to the concept of a person is placing the cart before the horse. 
 However, this is not to say that Strawson disallows the possibility of 
disembodied egos per se. All he rejects is the logical primitiveness of this 
concept. Since he grants that an ego can be analysed in terms of a person, he 
allows us to grant, if we choose to, disembodied egos a secondary existence. And 
indeed, some of us do in our discourse about dead people. A sentence such as 
‘John would be smiling in heaven right now’ is, in some sense, intelligible, even 
though the concept of John, if one has this concept at all in this case, would be 
that of a disembodied consciousness. Strawson explains that one has this concept 
only because one’s concept of a disembodied ego is that of an ego which formerly 
belongs to a person. A disembodied ego can be conceived as a former person, but 
the concept of a person is nonetheless primary. It is the logical priority of the 
concept of a person that Strawson wants to uphold.  
The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of 
an embodied anima. This is not to say that the concept of a pure individual 
consciousness might not have a logically secondary existence, if one thinks, or 
finds, it desirable . . . A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a 
disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having 
been a person.8 
 
 Strawson’s concept of a person has certain implications on the logical 
character of the predicates that ascribe states of consciousness. Strawson refers to 
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these predicates as ‘P-predicates’.9 A useful way to understand this is to revisit 
the epistemological problem of other minds. A Cartesian sceptic about other 
minds holds that since one can never directly identify other people’s experiences 
on pain of contradiction, it is possible that other people are not conscious in the 
way that one is. Bodily behavior, for the Cartesian sceptic, are signs of the 
presence of various states of consciousness in other individuals. One ascribes P-
predicates to others based on observation of their behavior. While behavior-
criteria may offer a good measure to determine the veracity of any other-
ascription of P-predicates, the Cartesian sceptic thinks they are not conclusive. 
Hence, he maintains it is at least possible that others are not conscious, unlike 
oneself.  
Another way of viewing the epistemological problem of other minds is 
this. A Cartesian notes that P-predicates are ascribed to others on the basis of 
behavior-criteria, but ascribed to oneself not on any such basis.10 For example, 
when the Cartesian says, “I am in pain”, he is expressing a certain experience that 
he feels directly. He does not need to observe his behavior to ascertain if the 
utterance is true. However, when he says, “John is in pain”, John’s behavior is at 
least some sort of criteria to determine the truth-value of this latter sentence. 
Therefore, the Cartesian sceptic argues P-predicates, or at least a significant class 
of them, seem to have two different meanings – a first- and a third-person 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 Ibid, p. 103 
9 Strawson defines ‘P-predicates’ as predicates that ascribe states of consciousness, or imply the 
possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed. See Ibid, pp. 104-105 
for elaboration.  
10 Strawson acknowledges that there are some P-predicates that are ascribed to oneself, as well as 
to others, on the basis of behavior-criteria, for example, predicates that carry assessments of 
character and capability. Strawson is not here concerned with these P-predicates since the unity of 
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ascriptive use. In other words, the meaning of P-predicates is not unified. 
Strawson illustrates the sceptic’s position with the concept of depression:   
We speak of behaving in a depressed way (of depressed behaviour) and we also 
speak of feeling depressed (of a feeling of depression). One is inclined to argue 
that feelings can be felt but not observed, and behaviour can be observed but not 
felt, and that therefore there must be room here to drive in a logical wedge.11 
 
Strawson cautions against such scepticism. He argues that if the 
epistemological problem is allowed to arise, then we are faced with a conceptual 
problem as well. There is no room to raise an epistemological problem of other 
minds unless one is willing to give up the concept of oneself. The epistemological 
problem arises only because one is holding on to the Cartesian account of a 
person. So, Strawson urges, the way out of the conceptual mess is to abandon the 
Cartesian model from which these difficulties stem. Instead of a compound entity, 
a person, according to Strawson, is a single type of entity to which both 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing physical 
properties are equally ascribable. Instead of taking behavior-criteria as signs of 
the presence of consciousness in others, they are “criteria of a logically adequate 
kind for the ascription of the P-predicates”.12 And, contrary to the Cartesian view 
that the meanings of P-predicates may not be unified given the difference in 
criteria for self- and other-ascriptions, Strawson maintains it is essential that their 
meanings remain uniform in spite of this. He writes: 
it is essential to the character of these predicates that they have both first- and 
third-person asriptive uses, that they are both self-ascribable otherwise than on 
the basis of observation of the behaviour of the subject of them, and other-
ascribable on the basis of behaviour criteria. To learn their use is to learn both 
aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one must be both a 
                                                                                                                                                              
their meanings is less likely to be in question. Henceforth, I am also excluding such P-predicates 
from my discussion.  
11 Ibid, p. 108 
12 Ibid, p. 106 
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self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as 
a self-ascriber . . . If there were no concepts answering to the characterization I 
have just given, we should indeed have no philosophical problem about the soul; 
but equally we should not have our concept of a person.13 
 
The logical character of P-predicates, according to Strawson, is such that they are  
unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the 
subject of the predicate and . . . independently of observation of the subject: the 
second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject”.14 
 
Returning to the example of depression, Strawson asserts:  
the concept of depression spans the place where one wants to drive [in the logical 
wedge] . . . X’s depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, 
but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X.15 
 
If one has any concept of P-predicates at all, then it must be a concept that has 
both first- and third-person ascriptive uses. If one’s concept of P-predicates were 
not as such, then one would not have any concept of P-predicates to begin with. 
That is, one would not be able to ascribe P-predicates to others, or to oneself. This 
brings us to Strawson’s answer to the two questions with which he began his 
inquiry: 1) Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And 
2) Why are states of consciousness ascribed to the very same thing as certain 
corporeal characteristics? I mentioned that Strawson thinks the answers to these 
questions are related. This is how:  
that a necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that 
they should be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal 
characteristics, a certain physical situation &c. That is to say, states of 
consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to persons, 
in the sense I have claimed for this word.16  
 
                                                          
13 Ibid, p. 108. Strawson’s use of the term “soul” is synonymous with my use of ‘mind’, or ‘ego’.  
14 Ibid, p. 108 
15 Ibid, pp. 108-109 
16 Ibid, p. 102 
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Put another way, if P-predicates are not ascribable to Strawsonian persons, then 
one would not have any concept of such P-predicates, i.e. states of consciousness 
would not be ascribed to anything in the first place.  
Having answered his two original questions, Strawson however concedes 
that there is one question remaining, namely, how is the concept of a person 
possible?  
This is the question by which we replace those two earlier questions . . . For the 
answer to these two initial questions is to be found nowhere else but in the 
admission of the primitiveness of the concept of a person, and hence of the 
unique character of P-predicates. So residual perplexities have to frame 
themselves in this new way. For when we have acknowledged the primitiveness 
of the concept of a person, and, with it, the unique character of P-predicates, we 
may still want to ask what it is in the natural facts that makes it intelligible that 
we should have this concept . . .17  
 
In the remaining part of the chapter ‘Persons’, Strawson attempts to put together 
“fragments of an answer” to this new question.18 This larger issue, however, lies 
beyond the scope of my thesis.  
 For the sake of focus, I have had to set aside several related issues in my 
thesis. One of them is the first of the two questions that Strawson raised: Why are 
one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? I have not examined 
why this question arises to begin with. Some philosophers think states of 
consciousness are not ascribed to anything in the first place. Strawson calls this 
the ‘No-Ownership Theory’ – a view that he also rejects. I have not been able to 
explain why that is, and regrettably direct readers to ‘Persons’ for this.19 Another 
                                                          
17 ibid, pp. 110-111 
18 ibid, p. 111 
19 See also A. J. Ayer, ‘The Concept of a Person’, in The Concept of a Person, (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1963); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, rev. ed., (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988);  
S. Campbell, ‘Strawson, Parfit and Impersonality’, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 30, 
No. 2, (Jun 2000); and N. Burstein, ‘Strawson on the Concept of a Person’, in Mind, New Series, 
Vol. 80, No. 319, (Jul 1971).  
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issue that I have not looked at is this. One of Strawson’s aim in ‘Persons’ is to 
explain what he takes to be a serious flaw in Cartesianism and replace the concept 
of the Cartesian ego with a Strawsonian account of a person. I think the latter 
account is superior, but it is, perhaps, not without its own difficulties. Some 
commentators, independent of any Cartesian sympathies, have criticised 
Strawson’s concept of a person. These issues too, I have not explored.20 
 The focus of my thesis lies in a specific three-premise argument that 
Strawson puts forth against Cartesianism. This argument makes a bold claim: 
anyone who holds that the concept of a person is essentially that of a Cartesian 
ego loses the concept of his own self. It is an elegant piece of reasoning, one that 
gives deep insight into the structures of our conceptual framework. But it is 
marred only by its occasional ambuiguities, as seen by the various 
misinterpretations of Strawson’s position. My main motivation in writing this 
thesis is to clarify the misunderstandings and explain in detail all its premises so 
that its brilliance may be revealed. Opaque as some of the premises are, and 
dubious as they may seem, Strawson’s argument against Cartesianism is a very 
resilient one, as I hope to have shown. Finally, Strawson’s work in Individuals, of 
which the chapter ‘Persons’ is only a small part, is his attempt to investigate and 
understand the structure of the conceptual scheme within which we work – a 
philosophical endeavour which he calls ‘descriptive metaphysics’. He believes it 
is our ill understanding of this structure and the relations between the elements 
that constitute it, that gives rise to conceptual confusion and lands us in the 
                                                          
20 See, for example, S. C. Coval, ‘Persons and Criteria’, in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Mar 1964); D. Sievert, ‘How Well Can One Get to Know a 
Strawsonian Person?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Jun 1974); 
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paradoxical, if not paralysing, position of doubting what we intuitively know, and 
denying what we tacitly affirm. Scepticism about other minds is one such 
example. By illuminating this structure, Strawson aims to show that our 
conceptual apparatus is well in place to support the intuitions that we have, and 
no radical revision of our worldview is necessary. It is Strawson’s conviction in 
the integrity of our conceptual structure, and his efforts to clarify that, that I take 
to be his richest philosophical contribution. My examination, and defence, of one 
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